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This  r epo r t  conta ins  a  d i scuss ion  of t h e  s i g n i f i c a n t  anomalies t h a t  
occurred during t h e  Apollo 16  mission.  The d iscuss ion  i s  d iv ided  i n t o  
f i v e  major s e c t i o n s :  command and s e r v i c e  modules, l u n a r  module, govern- 
ment-furnished equipment, l u n a r  s u r f a c e  experiments,  and o r b i t a l  exper i -  
ments. A l l  t imes  a r e  e lapsed  time from range zero ,  e s t a b l i s h e d  a s  t h e  
i n t e g r a l  second be fo re  l i f t - o f f .  
D AND SERVICE MODULE ANOMALIES 
2 1  WATERIGLYCOL TEMPERATURE CONTROL 
CIRCUIT FAILED I N  THE AUTOMATIC MODE 
About 3 hours i n t o  t h e  mission,  t h e  water/glycol  temperature c o n t r o l  
c i r c u i t  (fig. 2-1) malfunctioned i n  t h e  automatic mode. The malfunction 
allowed an excessive amount of  hot water/glycol  t o  bypass t h e  r a d i a t o r  
causing t h e  mixed water/glycol  temperature t o  exceed t h e  upper c o n t r o l  
l i m i t  of 48O F. Af'ter remaining i n  t h i s  maximum bypass pos i t ion  f o r  5 
minutes, t h e  temperature con t ro l  valve cycled r e g u l a r l y  between maximum 
and minimum flow t o  t h e  r a d i a t o r s  f o r  about 1 4  minutes before stopping 
again a t  maximum bypass. The con t ro l  was changed t o  manual and back t o  
automatic t o  r e s t a r t  t h e  valve operat ion and, f i n a l l y ,  l e f t  i n  manual a t  
t h e  des i r ed  valve pos i t ion .  Variat ions i n  t h e  evaporator o u t l e t  temper- 
a t u r e  and t o t a l  system flow r a t e  f o r  t h e  period a r e  shown i n  f i g u r e  2-2. 
Control valve opera t ion  i s  evident  from t h e  v a r i a t i o n  of system flow r a t e .  
To ta l  flow r a t e  increases  a s  t h e  flow con t ro l  valve opens s ince  t h e  t o t a l  
system pressure  drop decreases.  
The temperature con t ro l  valve was subsequently pos i t ioned manually 
seve ra l  t imes t o  maintain acceptable coolant loop temperatures under va r -  
ious  thermal condit ions.  During two attempts t o  pos i t ion  t h e  valve auto- 
ma t i ca l ly  (before and a f t e r  t h e  t r a n s e a r t h  ext ravehicular  a c t i v i t y )  t h e  
valve appeared t o  pos i t ion  c o r r e c t l y  b u t ,  only f o r  a shor t  t ime. 
Most l i k e l y ,  a malfunction occurred i n  t h e  water/glycol  temperature 
c o n t r o l l e r  which modulates t h e  con t ro l  valve by supplying s i g n a l  pulses  
with a dura t ion  propor t ional  t o  t h e  e r r o r  o f  t h e  mixed temperature sensed. 
Pos t f l igh t  t e s t i n g  of t h e  system i s  scheduled. 
This anomaly i s  open. 
2.2 SERVICE PROPULSION SYSTEM OXIDIZER 
TANK PRESSURE MEASWMEWT SHIFTED 
The se rv ice  propulsion system oxidizer  tank pressure measurement 
sh i f t ed  upward 1 5  p s i a  a f t e r  t h e  spacecraf t  reached a vacuum environment. 
The measurement responded t o  normal changes i n  pressure throughout t h e  
mission, but  always read 1 5  p s i a  high as v e r i f i e d  by o ther  measurements 
i n  t h e  system. 


Previous experience with t h i s  type  of t ransducer  showed t h a t  t h e  r e f -  
erence c a v i t y  can l e a k  through t h e  header ,  F a i l u r e  h i s t o r i e s  shorcr t h a t  
l eaks  can occur through t h e  feed-through tubes  i n  t h e  header and a t  t h e  
header-to-case weld ( f i g .  2 - 3 ) ,  During a l t i t u d e  chamber t e s t s  f o r  Apollo 
16  and during t h e  Apollo 1 2  mission,  a s i m i l a r  t ransducer  showed t h e  same 
type  of f a i l u r e ,  The Apollo 16  t r ansduce r  ( r ep l aced  a f t e r  t h e  a l t i t u d e  
chamber t e s t s )  had not  had a vacuum check s i n c e  1965. 
The c o r r e c t i v e  a c t i o n  w i l l  b e  t o  r e q u i r e  a vacuum check of a l l  i n -  
s t a l l e d  o r  replacement p re s su re  t r ansduce r s  which have a s e a l e d  r e f e r -  
ence c a v i t y .  
This anomaly is  c losed .  
2.3 ERRONEOUS GIMBAL LOCK INDICATION 
A t  38:18:56, t h e  computer i s sued  a gimbal lock  i n d i c a t i o n  when no 
gimbal l ock  condi t ion  ex i s t ed .  The veh ic l e  was i n  t h e  pas s ive  thermal  
c o n t r o l  mode, r o l l i n g  at minus 0.3 degree per  second, and t h e  computer 
was i n  t h e  p la t form realignment program a t  t h a t  t ime.  A t  38 :18 : 54.7, 
t h e  computer i d l i n g  program was s e l e c t e d .  This caused t h e  t h r u s t  v e c t o r  
enable  d i s c r e t e  t o  b e  removed from t h e  coupling d i sp l ay  u n i t  assembly. 
Removing t h e  d i s c r e t e  causes a r e l a y  t o  switch t h e  source of an  800-hertz 
e x c i t a t i o n  vol tage .  I n t e r r u p t i n g  t h e  800-hertz vol tage  caused a t r a n s i e n t  
which was e lec t romagnet ica l ly  coupled i n t o  t h e  middle gimbal angle  coup- 
l i n g  d i sp l ay  u n i t  read  counter  which erroneously s e t  t h e  90-degree b i t .  
The computer sensed t h e  change i n  t h e  read counter and determined t h a t  
t h e  middle gimbal angle  was g r e a t e r  t han  85 degrees (gimbal lock  condi- 
t i o n ) .  The computer t hen  downrnoded t h e  i n e r t i a l  subsystem t o  t h e  coa r se  
a l i g n  mode which caged t h e  p la t form t o  t h e  present  body r e fe rence  angles .  
F igure  2-4 i s  a s imp l i f i ed  r ep re sen ta t ion  of  t h e  p e r t i n e n t  c i r c u i t s  
i n  t h e  middle gimbal angle  coupling d i s p l a y  u n i t .  The purpose of  t h e  
r e a d  counter  i s  t o  s t o r e ,  i n  d i g i t a l  form, t h e  platform gimbal angle .  I f  
t h e  gimbal angle  changes, t h e  analog s i g n a l  i s  no longer  t h e  same a s  t h e  
d i g i t a l  s i g n a l  from t h e  read counter  and t h e  r e s u l t i n g  e r r o r  s i g n a l  causes 
a pu l se  t r a i n  t o  be generated.  The pulse  t r a i n  increments o r  decrements 
t h e  read  counter  u n t i l  it matches t h e  analog gimbal angle .  The read  
counter  i s  a s e r i e s  of f l i p - f l o p  l o g i c  c i r c u i t s  whose only inpu t s  a r e  
a pu l se  t r a i n  and t iming pulses .  The 90-degree b i t  i s  unique, however, 
because it can a l s o  be  s e t  by an ambiguity d i s c r e t e .  'The purpose of t h e  
ambiguity d i s c r e t e  i s  t o  prevent t h e  p la t form from going t o  an  ambiguous 
p o s i t i o n  when t h e  i i i e r t i a l  meas-weinent wilt i s  tu rned  on, 
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Figure  2-3. - Service prolsulsion system pressure trat?sducer fai l ~ l ve .  
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Figure 2-4.- Coupling display unit functional diagram. 
The cause of  t h e  problem was an erroneous ambiguous d i s c r e t e  which 
s e t  t h e  90-degree b i t  i n  t h e  middle gimbal angle  read  counter ,  The d i s -  
c r e t e  was apparent ly  caused by a t r a n s i e n t  genera ted  when t h e  800-hertz 
e x c i t a t i o n  vol tage  was switched from one source t o  another .  A t r a n s i e n t  
caused by switching power sources i s  h i g h l y  improbable s ince  it i s  de- 
pendent upon t iming  o f  t h e  r e l a y  a c t i v i t y  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  800-hertz 
v o l t  age. 
The erroneous gimbal lock problem was circumvented i n  f l i g h t  by t h e  
use  of an e r a s a b l e  program which i n h i b i t e d  t h e  computer from changing t h e  
s t a t u s  of t h e  coarse  a l i g n  r e l a y  v h i l e  t h e  e r a sab le  program was loaded i n  
t h e  computer. 
No hardware changes a r e  a n t i c i p a t e d .  
This anomaly i s  open. 
2.4 INERTIAL SUBSYSTEM WARNINGS AND 
COUPLING DISPLAY UNIT FAIL INDICATIONS 
The i n e r t i a l  subsystem varn ing  l i g h t  was observed t o  i l l umina te  s i x  
t imes  dur ing  t h e  t r a n s e a r t h  por t ion  o f  t h e  f l i g h t .  Each i l l umina t ion  was 
accompanied by a program warning of  an i n e r t i a l  coupling d i sp l ay  u n i t  f a i l -  
u re .  The warning i n d i c a t i o n s  were i n t e r m i t t e n t ;  t h e  f i r s t  fou r  c l e a r e d  
themselves,  and t h e  last  two were removed by bumping an access  pane l  i n  
t h e  lower equipment bay. 
The coupling d i sp l ay  u n i t  assembly conta ins  f a i l u r e  d e t e c t i o n  c i r -  
c u i t s  which monitor t h e  performance of  each u n i t  and a f a i l u r e  d i s c r e t e  
i s  s en t  t o  t h e  computer i f  one or more of  t h e  fo l lowing  condi t ions  e x i s t  
f o r  more than 3 t o  7 seconds. The f i r s t  t h r e e  condi t ions  would b e  d i -  
r e c t l y  observable *om f l i g h t  da t a ;  t h e  l a s t  two may not  n e c e s s a r i l y  b e  
de t ec t ed  from f l i g h t  da t a .  
a. Coarse e r r o r  d e t e c t  - A disagreement of  approximately 30-degrees 
between a r ead  counter  and t h e  1 X  gimbal r e s o l v e r .  
b. Fine e r r o r  d e t e c t  - A disagreement of more than  0.7 degree be- 
tween a r e a d  counter  and t h e  1 6 ~  gimbal r e s o l v e r .  
c .  Cosine ( 8  - 4) - Voltage l e s s  than  4 Vrms. This vo l tage  i s  nor-  
mally 4 Vrms when t h e  read  counter  agrees  with t h e  r e s o l v e r  vo l tage .  
d. Read counter  l i m i t  cyc le  - The read  counter  changes t h e  d i r e c t i o n  
i.n which it i s  count ing a t  a r a t e  g r e a t e r  than  160 t imes per  second, 
e ,  14-volt-dc power supply - The 14-volt-dc power suppLy i n  t h e  
coupling d i sp l ay  u n i t  decreases  t o  8 v o l t s  dc o r  l e s s ,  
The time de lay  associated. wi th  t h e  f a i l u r e  d i s c r e t e  t o  t h e  computer 
was measured i n  f l i g h t  as approximately 5 seconds. The f a i l u r e  i nd ica -  
t i o n s  p e r s i s t e d  f o r  4 ,  1 2 ,  1 6 ,  894, 10 ,  and 38 seconds, r e s p e c t i v e l y .  
Data during each occurrence has been reviewed and no abnormal i t ies  
were observed. I f  a r e a l  f a i l u r e  of  t h e  coupling d i sp l ay  u n i t  had oc- 
cur red  and l a s t e d  a s  long as 894 seconds, t hen  some d a t a  i n d i c a t i o n  should 
have been observed. For t h i s  reason ,  an i n t e r m i t t e n t  s h o r t  i n  t h e  wi r ing  
harness  o r  a s s o c i a t e d  connectors shown i n  f i g u r e  2-5 i s  suspected.  How- 
e v e r ,  o the r  poss ib l e  causes may b e  an i n t e r m i t t e n t  i n  t h e  f a i l u r e  detec-  
t i o n  l o g i c  c i r c u i t s  o r  t h e  input  l o g i c  t o  t h e  computer. 
P o s t f l i g h t  t e s t s  on t h e  ind iv idua l  subassemblies m e  scheduled. 
This  anomaly i s  open. 
2.5 HIGH HEAT LEAK INTO HYDROGEN TANK 3 
The hea t  l e a k  i n t o  cryogenic hydrogen tank  3 was abnormal dur ing  t h e  
e a r l y  hours o f  t h e  mission.  Analysis of  t h e  Kennedy Space Center d a t a  has  
shown t h a t  t h e  h e a t  l e a k  of  t h i s  tank was normal p r i o r  t o  l i f t - o f f .  As 
shown i n  f i g u r e  2-6, t h e  l e a k  decreased from a high va lue  of 15  t o  20 ~ t u /  
hour t o  a normal 2 t o  6 ~ t u / h o u r  by 70 hours and remained normal t h e r e -  
a f t e r .  A l l  o t h e r  parameters were normal. 
The i n s u l a t i o n  f o r  t h i s  tank  c o n s i s t s  of  s e v e r a l  l a y e r s  of  gold- 
coa ted  H-film i n  a vacuum annulus t h a t  i s  formed between t h e  i n n e r  pres -  
s u r e  v e s s e l  and t h e  ou te r  s h e l l  ( f i g .  2-7).  The primary i n s u l a t i o n  system 
i s ,  however, t h e  vacuum annulus.  Degradation o f  t h i s  i n s u l a t i n g  vacuum 
w i l l  cause a s i g n i f i c a n t  i nc rease  i n  t h e  hea t  l e a k  i n t o  t h e  t ank  a s  shown 
i n  f i g u r e  2-8. The a n a l y s i s  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  t h e  high i n i t i a l  hea t  l e a k  r e -  
s u l t e d  from a degradat ion of t h i s  vacuum by approximately one decade (ap- 
proximately l o m 6  t o  t o r r ) .  This degradat ion could have been caused 
by e i t h e r  of  two occurrences:  
a .  I f  thermal  i n s u l a t i o n  l a y e r s  rubbed aga ins t  one another  during 
t h e  launch phase v i b r a t i o n ,  t h e  condi t ion  could have caused t h e  r e l e a s e  
of prev ious ly  entrapped o r  absorbed gas molecules i n t o  t h e  annulus.  
5, An z i d i e n t  air l e a k  i n t o  t h e  annulus could have occurred dur ing  
launch,  
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Figure 2-6 .- Hydrogen heat leak data. 
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Figure 2-7 .- Hydrogen tank. 

Analysis i s  continuing t o  fu r the r  invest igate  both of these  poss ibi l -  
i t i e s .  In  addit ion,  studies are  continuing t o  v e r i e  t ha t  pressure osc i l -  
l a t i ons  did not contribute t o  t h e  high heat  leak,  
A hydrogen leak i n t o  t h e  annulus has been ru led  out because a hydro- 
gen leak should have continued throughout t he  mission, and would have 
caused t h e  heat leak t o  remain at a high leve l .  The qua l i f i ca t ion  vibra- 
t i o n  t e s t  l e v e l s  and procedures f o r  t he  hydrogen tank have been reviewed 
and axe adequate. 
This anomaly i s  open. 
2.6 UP-DATA LINK COMMAND CAPABILITY LOSS 
The spacecraft  f a i l e d  t o  respond t o  uplink real-time commands a t  
42:23: 09 and again a t  207:14 :36. I n  each case, t h e  condition ex i s ted  
u n t i l  t h e  crew cycled t h e  up-telemetry command r e se t  switch. This re- 
stored normal operation. 
A s imi la r  problem w a s  experienced on Apollo 9. Extensive review of 
t h e  spacecraft  data ,  t e s t i n g  of f l i g h t  hardware, and analysis  of t h e  com- 
mand system did  not identi* a spec i f i c  cause of t h e  problem. A specia l  
low-voltage t e s t  d id  show t h a t  a low-voltage t rans ien t  could change t h e  
vehicle address r eg i s t e r  and i nh ib i t  receipt  of any commands u n t i l  power 
i s  cycled t o  OFF and back t o  ON,  r e s e t t i ng  the  r eg i s t e r .  However, on 
Apollo 9 ,  telemetry data  f a i l e d  t o  ind ica te  any voltage t rans ien t  condi- 
t i ons  t h a t  could be expected t o  change t h e  vehicle address. 
Tests of t h e  Apollo 16 spacecraft up-data l i nk  equipment a re  planned. 
This anomaly i s  open. 
2.7 LiEAKAGE DURING INFLIGHT CHLORINATION 
During t h e  t h i r d  da i ly  water system chlorination,  d i f f i cu l t y  was ex- 
perienced i n  i n j ec t i ng  t h e  chlorine ampule. IN he chlorine ampule i s  placed 
i n  an i n j ec to r  before use, ) Advancing ( ro t a t i ng )  of t he  i n j ec to r  knob 
seemed s t i f f e r  than usual  and f l u i d  leakage was noted a t  t h e  in te r face  be- 
tween t h e  needle assembly and t h e  i n j ec to r  when t h e  in jec tor  was removed. 
This leaking stopped quickly, however, and no loosening of t h e  in jec t ion  
port septum retent ion i n s e r t  is  suspected. A following buf fe r  in jec t ion  
attempt a l so  appeared t o  produce some minor leakage. Subsequently, an- 
other buffer  ampule was in jec ted  successfully. Figure 2-9 shows t yp i ca l l y  
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Figure 2-9 .- Chlorine ampule failure 
bow the Teflon b ladder  can be forced  pas t  t h e  i n j e c t o r  base  p l a t e ,  The 
ou te r  cy l inde r  i s  not  s u f f i c i e n t l y  r i g i d  t o  prevent  t h e  b ladder  from ex- 
t r u d i n g  around t h e  base  p l a t e  and be ing  c reased ,  which would be conducive 
t o  l e a k s .  
When examined by t h e  crew, t h e  ch lo r ine  ampule appeared t o  b e  broken 
( l eak ing )  and t h e  inne r  bag was v i s i b l e  a f t e r  having been extruded p a s t  
t h e  base  p l a t e .  Inner  bag ex t rus ion  has been observed be fo re  b u t  has n o t  
been a s soc i a t ed  with l eaks .  The arnpule was l a t e r  J e t t i s o n e d  with t h e  l u -  
nar module. 
A l l  ampules which were r e tu rned  with t h e  command module w i l l  b e  in-  
spec ted  f o r  abnormali t ies  and sub j ec t ed  t o  l e a k  t e s t s .  
This anomaly i s  open. 
2.8 FAILURE: OF MASS SPECTROMETER BOOM TO FULLY RETRACT 
During s c i e n t i f i c  instrument  module experiment ope ra t ions ,  t h e  mass 
spectrometer  boommechanism s t a l l e d  and would not  f u l l y  r e t r a c t .  The prox- 
imi ty  switches i nd ica t ed  t h a t  t h e  mechanism always r e t r a c t e d  pas t  t h e  s a f e  
s e rv i ce  propulsion system f i r i n g  p o s i t i o n  except before  t r a n s e a r t h  i n j e c -  
t i o n .  A t  t h a t  t ime,  t h e  mechanism s t a l l e d  two-thirds out  (approximately 
200 inches )  and would n e i t h e r  extend nor r e t r a c t .  The boom mechanism and 
experiment were j e t t i s o n e d  p r i o r  t o  t h e  t r a n s e a r t h  i n j e c t i o n  maneuver. The 
cause of t h e  previous stalls i s  not known, but  bunching or  snagging dur ing  
r e t r a c t i o n  of t h e  c o i l e d  experiment power cable  i s  considered t h e  most prob- 
a b l e  cause a s  t h i s  had occurred previous ly  during 1-g t e s t i n g .  
The Apollo 17 luna r  sounder has  two HF antennas which a r e  deployed and 
r e t r a c t e d  by a mechanism t h a t  i s  t h e  same i n  concept a s  t h e  mass spectrom- 
e t e r  and t h e  gamma ray  boom mechanisms ( s e e  sec . 2.9) . However, t h e  HF 
antenna mechanism i s  a simpler  design and t h e  antenna has no cables  which 
a r e  r equ i r ed  t o  t r a v e l  i n  and out  with t h e  antenna. 
A review of  t h e  HF antenna mechanism design and q u a l i f i c a t i o n  r equ i r e -  
ments i s  be ing  made, and a spec t s  o ther  tha,n cab le  bunching a r e  be ing  s tud-  
i e d .  
This anomaly i s  open. 
2.9  G RAY SPECTRO!XECTER BOOM MlECRANISM STALLED 
Duxing s c i e n t i f i c  instrument module experiment opera t ions ,  t h e  gamma 
ray  spectrometer  boom mechanism s t a l l e d  and would no t  f u l l y  r e t r a c t  on 
t h r e e  of f i v e  r e t r a c t i o n s .  The boom mechanism always r e t r a c t e d  pas t  t h e  
s a fe  s e r v i c e  propuls ion  system f i r i n g  p o s i t i o n  a s  i nd ica t ed  by t h e  prox- 
imi ty  switch. 
The cause o f  t h e  r e t r a c t  f a i l u r e  i s  not  known, b u t  bunching o f  t h e  
c o i l e d  experiment power cable  a t  t h e  annulus o f  t h e  stowage housing dur- 
i ng  r e t r a c t i o n  i s  considered t h e  most probable reason s i n c e  t h i s  has hap- 
pened on o t h e r  occasions during l - g  t e s t i n g .  
Aspects o t h e r  t han  cable  bunching a r e  be ing  s tudied .  
This anomaly i s  open. 
2.10 SERVICE PROPULSION ENGINE GIMBAL ACTUATOR OSCILLATIONS 
During t h e  p re - ign i t i on  c h e c k l i s t  f o r  t h e  luna r  o r b i t  c i r c u l a r i z a -  
t i o n  maneuver, an o s c i l l a t i o n  was de t ec t ed  i n  t h e  yaw a x i s  of t h e  second- 
a ry  servo system f o r  t h e  s e r v i c e  propuls ion  engine gimbal a c t u a t o r .  Fig-  
u r e  2-10 i s  a f u n c t i o n a l  diagram o f  t h e  servo  loop .  The o s c i l l a t i o n  was 
p re sen t  i n  all modes of opera t ion ,  b u t  on ly  when t h e  secondary yaw servo  
loop was used.  The o s c i l l a t i o n  was l i m i t e d  a t  k1.0 degree and a t  2 .4  
h e r t z  wi th  t h e  gimbal c o r r e c t l y  fol lowing commands t o  d i f f e r e n t  p o s i t i o n s .  
Figure 2-11 shows one occasion t h a t  t h e  o s c i l l a t i o n  d id  no t  occur when r e -  
pos i t i on ing  t h e  engine which impl ies  t h a t  t h e  f a i l u r e  i s  e l e c t r i c a l  i n  
na ture  . 
I n f l i g h t  r e s u l t s  were matched by s imulat ions o f  system performance 
with an open i n  t h e  r a t e  feedback loop of  t h e  yaw servo system. It was 
a l s o  demonstrated t h a t  t h e  o s c i l l a t i o n s  would have damped a f t e r  i g n i t i o n  
because of t h e  s i d e  load  f o r c e s  exer ted  on t h e  engine b e l l  while  t h r u s t -  
ing .  Therefore,  t h e  secondary yaw servo system was considered s a f e  t o  
use i f  t h e  primary servo system were t o  f a i l  and it became necessary t o  
switch over t o  t h e  secondary system. 
Cause of t h e  f a i l u r e  i s  an open i n  t h e  r a t e  feedback loop of t h e  sec-  
ondary yaw servo  system. The open could have occurred i n  t h e  r a t e  t r a n s -  
ducer ,  spacec ra f t  wi r ing  and a s soc i a t ed  connectors ,. o r  i n  t h e  t h r u s t  vec- 
t o r  servo assembly e l e c t r o n i c s  package, Post f l i g h t  t e s t i n g  o f  t h e  command 
module po r t ion  o f  t h e  wir ing  and of  t h e  e l e c t r o n i c s  package w i l l  b e  per-  
formed i n  an at tempt  t o  i s o l a t e  t h e  open. 
This  anomaly i s  open, 
Gimbal  commands from: 
a .  Primary guidance 
5. Staoil ization and control 
auto mode 
c .  Sta l~ i l izat ion and control 
rate command 
d.  Stabil ization and control 
acceleration command 
Figure 2-10.- Service propulsion system gimbal servo diagram. 
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2.11 NOISE FROM CABIN FANS 
Approximately 24 hours af'ter docking with t h e  luna r  module, t h e  com- 
mand module cabin f ans  produced a loud moaning sound. The f ans  were de- 
a c t i v a t e d  and not  used aga in  during t h e  mission. No cause f o r  t h e  m a l -  
func t ion  could b e  determined by t h e  crew. A f i l t e r  had been i n s t a l l e d  
f o r  t h e  f i r s t  t ime f o r  t h i s  mission t o  provide p r o t e c t i o n  from f l o a t i n g  
ob jec t s  en t e r ing  t h e  o u t l e t  o f  t h e  f a n  assembly during non-operating per -  
iods .  
P o s t f l i g h t  examination of  t h e  fans  i s  scheduled. 
This anomaly i s  open. 
2.12 VACUUM CLEANER FAILURF: 
The crew repor t ed  t h a t ,  a f t e r  a pe r iod  o f  succes s fu l  ope ra t ion ,  t h e  
vacuum c l eane r  f a i l e d .  The inope ra t ive  u n i t  emi t ted  a low hum and w a s  
subsequent ly disconnected and stowed f o r  en t ry .  
P o s t f l i g h t  ope ra t iona l  t e s t s  and a n a l y s i s  m e  scheduled. 
This  anomaly i s  open. 
2.13 ERRONEOUS SUIT PRESSURE TRANSDUCER READING 
While t h e  cabin  was depressur ized  during t h e  t r a n s e a r t h  extravehicu-  
l a r  a c t i v i t y ,  t h e  i nd ica t ed  environmental c o n t r o l  system suit loop  pres-  
su re  t ransducer  r ead ing  w a s  4.6 p s i a  ( f i g .  2-12). Spec i f i ca t ion  va lues  
f o r  t h i s  r egu la t ed  p re s su re  a r e  3.5 t o  4.0 p s i a  and t h e  con t ro l  po in t  de- 
termined from Kennedy Space Center a l t i t u d e  chamber t e s t i n g  was 3.8 p s i a .  
The Commander's and Lunar Module P i l o t ' s  s u i t  cu f f  gage readings of  3.55 
and 3.95 p s i a  ( s e c .  4 .6)  i nd ica t ed  t h a t  p re s su re  r egu la t ion  was s a t i s f a c -  
t o r y  and t h a t  t h e  t ransducer  reading  was erroneous.  
P r i o r  t o  t h e  reduced cabin pressure  ope ra t ions ,  t h e  s u i t  t r ansduce r  
performed acceptab ly  and read wi th in  0 . 1  p s i  o f  t h e  cabin pressure  t r a n s -  
ducer  wi th  t h e  s u i t  loop  open t o  cabin.  Af'ter cabin r e p r e s s u r i z a t i o n ,  t h e  
s u i t  t ransducer  aga in  appeared t o  read  c o r r e c t l y .  . 
P o s t f l i g h t  t e s t s  of t h e  t ransducer  a r e  scheduled. 
This anomaly i s  open, 

2.14 DIGITAL EVENT TIMER COUNTED ERRA.TECALLY 
The d i g i t a l  event t imer  on panel  1 ind ica t ed  erroneous time (compmed 
t o  computer t ime)  a f t e r  count ing up o r  down over a p r e s e t  time i n t e r v a l .  
The d i g i t a l  event  t imer  performed s a t i s f a c t o r i l y  dur ing  t h e  e a r l y  p o r t i o n  
of t h e  miss ion ,  bu t  began t o  malflznction approximately midway through t h e  
f l i g h t  . 
A similar problem occurred on Apollo 10 and was caused by nonconduc- 
t i v e  p a r t i c l e s  becoming momentarily lodged between t h e  brushes and s l i p  
r i n g  t a b s  of t h e  counter  wheels ( f i g .  2-13). These were pa in t  p a r t i c l e s  
from a number counter  wheel which was abra ided  by t h e  i d l e r  gear .  
P o s t f l i g h t  t e s t i n g  of t h e  d i g i t a l  event t imer  i s  scheduled. 
This  anomaly i s  open. 
2.15 UNEVEN DRIVE RATES OF THE SCANNING TELESCOPE 
The crew repor t ed  t h a t  t h e  scanning t e l e scope  s h a f t  ax i s  drove e r r a t -  
i c a l l y  and seemed t o  ge t  worse with t ime.  The condi t ion  was observed i n  
t h e  computer mode and t h e  zero o p t i c s  mode and only through t h e  t e l e scope .  
The uneven d r i v e  r a t e  was r e l a t e d  t o  a change i n  t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  n o i s e  
l e v e l  when t h e  o p t i c s  was be ing  dr iven .  The crew could not be c e r t a i n  
whether t h e  uneven d r i v e  r a t e s  were d i r e c t l y  o r  i nve r se ly  p ropor t iona l  t o  
t h e  no i se  l e v e l .  
The t e l e scope  s h a f t  ax i s  i s  s laved  t o  t h e  sex tan t  s h a f t  through 1X 
r e s o l v e r s  i n  each u n i t .  Since no d r i v e  problem was repor ted  wi th  t h e  sex- 
t a n t  and no uneven d r ive  r a t e s  have been observed i n  f l i g h t  d a t a ,  t h e  most 
l i k e l y  sources of t h e  problem a r e  t h e  t e l e scope  motor tachometer,  t h e  mo- 
t o r  d r ive  ampl i f i e r  e l e c t r o n i c s ,  t h e  t e l e scope  gear  t r a i n  assembly, and 
t h e  t runnion  p o s i t i o n  angle counter .  
P o s t f l i g h t  t e s t i n g  o f  t h e  o p t i c a l  u n i t  i s  scheduled. 
This anomaly i s  open. 
Contaminated area 
Interference point 
Idler g e a r l  
Figure 2-13 .- Dig i ta l  event timer seconds counter. 
2-16 S T I C K I N G  LIlm-IIuavl KYDROXIDE XLEW-W 
During t h e  f i r s t  l i th ium hydroxide element change performed a f % e r  
redocking with t h e  lunar  module, considerable d i f f i c u l t y  was experienced 
i n  removing a used element from s ide  B of  t h e  environmental control  u n i t  
can i s t e r .  Some minor s t i ck ing  was a l s o  noted during an e a r l i e r  regular  
change. No problems were noted with o ther  elements. 
Both of t h e  s t i c k i n g  elements had been used extensively during lunar  
o r b i t  solo operat ions and probably had expanded due t o  re ten t ion  of excess 
moisture. Under conditions of high flow, low temperature, and low carbon 
dioxide supply, t h e  exothermic rea.ction heat  i s  insuf f i c ien t  t o  d r ive  off 
t h e  atmospheric and react ion moisture. Such conditions may have e x i s t e d  
during t h i s  period.  
Although t h e  f i r s t  element was j e t t i soned  with the  lunar module, t h e  
second element was re turned f o r  analys is .  Pos t f l igh t  inspection of t h i s  
element revealed a bulge ( f i g ,  2-14) . To accomodate some element swell ing,  
t h e  elements and environmental control  u n i t  c a n i s t e r  a re  s ized t o  provide 
a minimum clearance of 0.030 inch on all four  s ides  of a new element when 
i n s t a l l e d .  I n  addi t ion ,  all f l i g h t  elements are  f i t  checked i n  each canis-  
t e r  s ide  with 0.030-inch-thick shims i n  place p r i o r  t o  launch and removal 
force  i s  recorded (not  t o  exceed 30 l b ) .  However, t h e  ex te r io r  skin  of  
t h e  element has l i t t l e  r i g i d i t y  and "oil-cans" very eas i ly .  
Pos t f l igh t  t e s t i n g  i s  being performed on t h e  s t i ck ing  element. 
This anomaly i s  open. 

3.0 LUNAR MODULE ANOMALIES 
3.1 PAINT FLAKING FROM THERMAL SHIELD PANELS 
J u s t  p r i o r  t o  t r anspos i t ion  and docking, p a r t i c l e s  were coming off  
the  thermal s h i e l d  panels on t h e  minus Y s i d e  of t h e  ascent  s tage .  The 
p a r t i c l e s  caused t h e  panels t o  have a  grass- l ike  appearance as shown i n  
f igure  3-1. (The a f t  equipment rack thermal sh ie lds  and t h e  insu la t ion  
dangling from t h e  bottom of t h e  ascent  s tage  shown i n  f igure  3-1 a r e  d is -  
cussed i n  sec t ion  3.2. ) The pa in t  f l akes  i n t e r f e r r e d  with s t a r  s ight ings  
and were p o t e n t i a l  o p t i c a l  surface  contaminants. Thermal t e s t s  conducted 
on specimens removed from a  lunar  module panel  demonstrated t h a t  t h e  p a i n t  
on the  panels s t a r t s  t o  pee l  a t  approximately minus 120' F. The p red ic ted  
minimum temperature of t h e  panels during t h e  mission i s  minus 270' F. 
Effec t ive  with t h e  Apollo 1 5  spacec ra f t ,  f i v e  changes were made t o  t h e  
vehic le  t o  minimize t h e  r eac t ion  con t ro l  system propel lant  temperatures f o r  
the  72-hour lunar  s t a y  design case.  One change was t h a t  16 panels on t h e  
ascent s tage  were pain ted  white.  The most e f f e c t i v e  of t h e  f i v e  changes 
was t h e  addi t ion  of tank insu la t ion .  The e f f e c t  of t o t a l  l o s s  of t h e  p a i n t  
on the  panels r e s u l t s  i n  a  maximum reac t ion  con t ro l  system propel lant  tem- 
pera ture  increase  of approximately 2' F. 
The cor rec t ive  ac t ion  f o r  Apollo 17  w i l l  be t o  remove t h e  pa in t  from 
t h e  panels .  
This anomaly i s  closed.  
3.2 AFT EQUIPMENT RACK PANELS TORN LOOSE 
A t  lunar  l i f t - o f f ,  four v e r t i c a l  thermal sh ie lds  ( f i g .  3-1) on t h e  
a f t  equipment rack were t o r n  loose from t h e  lower standoffs  and remained 
a t tached only a t  t h e  upper s tandoffs .  This occurrence was observed from 
the  lunar-based t e l e v i s i o n .  
The most probable cause of t h e  f a i l u r e  was ascent  engine exhaust en- 
t e r i n g  t h e  cavi ty  behind these  thermal s h i e l d s ,  A cross sec t ion  of the  
lower edge of t h e  sh ie lds  i s  shown i n  f i g u r e  3-2. The thermal s h i e l d  ex- 
tending below t h e  support tube allowed a  pressure buildup on t h e  c losure  
s h i e l d  which exceeded i t s  capab i l i ty .  Once t h e  closure s h i e l d  f a i l e d ,  
the  exhaust entered  t h e  cavi ty  behind t h e  s h i e l d ,  r e s u l t i n g  i n  a  pressure  
buildup exceeding t h e  capab i l i ty  of t h e  v e r t i c a l  thermal sh ie lds .  

Fastner 
Closure 
(a) Existing thermal shield conftguration. 
Thermal blanket 
T her Thermal blanket standoff 
pane 
Fastner asse~nbly 
Base heat shield 
Metal l tc standoff 
(b) Proposed thern~al shield coilfiyuration. 
Fighire 3 -2 . -  Af t  equiptnerit rack ther~nal  protection configi~ratioii. 
I n  t h e  luna r  su r f ace  photographs taken p r i o r  t o  l i f t - o f f ,  some of t h e  
s h i e l d s  appear t o  have come loose  from t h e  cen te r  s tandoff  ( f i g .  3 - 3 ) .  
Excessive gaps between some of t h e  panels  a r e  ev iden t .  Both condi t ions  
could be caused by excessive p re s su re  i n  t h e  thermal b lanket  due t o  i n s u f -  
f i c i e n t  vent ing  during boos t .  
The vent ing  conf igura t ion  of t h e  b lanket  and adequacy of t h e  vent de- 
s i g n  c r i t e r i a  a r e  be ing  reviewed. The co r rec t ive  a c t i o n  planned is  t o  at 
l e a s t  redes ign  t h e  thermal  s h i e l d  t o  e l imina te  t h e  p r o j e c t i o n  below t h e  
support tube  as shown i n  f i g u r e  3-2. 
Photographs of  t h e  ascent  s t a g e  taken  p r i o r  t o  rendezvous docking 
( f i g .  3-1) show i n s u l a t i o n  hanging from t h e  p lus  Y base h e a t  s h i e l d .  An 
examination of photographs i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  t h e  most probable source of t h e  
i n s u l a t i o n  i s  t h e  thermal  s h i e l d  b lanket  covering t h e  descent  s t a g e  b l a s t  
d e f l e c t o r .  This s h i e l d  i s  normally blown o f f  during ascent  engine i g n i -  
t i o n ;  t h e r e f o r e ,  no c o r r e c t i v e  a c t i o n  i s  requi red  f o r  t h i s  condi t ion .  
This anomaly i s  open. 
3.3 STEERABLE ANTENNA INOPERATIVE I N  YAW AXIS 
The S-band s t e e r a b l e  antenna ( f i g .  3-4) would not move i n  t h e  yaw ax i s  
during i n i t i a l  a c t i v a t i o n .  Seve ra l  unsuccessful  a t tempts  were made t o  op- 
e r a t e  t h e  u n i t  us ing  both t h e  manual slew and au to  t r a c k  modes. The an- 
tenna  was used i n  l u n a r  o r b i t  f o r  a  s h o r t  per iod  by changing t h e  veh ic l e  
a t t i t u d e  t o  p o i n t  t h e  antenna at t h e  e a r t h .  
Photographs and i n f l i g h t  t e s t  d a t a  show t h a t  t h e  problem was caused by 
f a i l u r e  of t h e  mechanical stow l a t c h  t o  r e l e a s e .  Funct iona l ly ,  t h e  stow 
l a t c h  r e s t r a i n s  t h e  antenna dur ing  launch.  Figure 3-5 shows t h e  func t iona l  
opera t ion  of t h e  l a t c h .  The lock  p i n ,  when extended, holds t h e  antenna i n  
t h e  stowed p o s i t i o n .  A sp r ing  i s  h e l d  under compression by a s l eeve  which 
i s  cons t ra ined  t o  t h e  l a t c h  housing by so lde r .  Melting t h e  s o l d e r  allows 
t h e  spr ing  t o  push t h e  s leeve  which, i n  t u r n ,  r a i s e s  t h e  lock  p i n  out of 
t h e  r e t a i n e r .  A manual mode is  provided f o r  checkout purposes.  The l e v e r  
( f i g .  3-5) w i l l  p u l l  t h e  lock  p i n  p a s t  t h e  b a l l  d e t e n t ,  t hus  r e l e a s i n g  t h e  
antenna without  d i s t u r b i n g  t h e  spring-sleeve-solder  conf igura t ion .  
p r i  
i n  
Antenna photographs, t aken  on t h e  l u n a r  sur face  and i n  l una r  o r b i t  
.or  t o  docking i n d i c a t e  t h a t  t h e  l e v e r  f o r  t h e  yaw ax i s  l a t c h  was s t i l l  
t h e  locked p o s i t i o n .  The crew noted a  2- t o  3-degree movement of t h e  
yaw i n d i c a t o r  during a c t i v a t i o n  at tempts  . Tolerances i n  t h e  antenna r e -  
t a i n e r l l o c k i n g  mechanism allow a s l i g h t  movement of t h e  antenna dish even 
though t h e  p i n  i s  locked,  This  condit ion was dupl-icated in ground t e s t s ,  
and i s  norma,l f o r  a  stowed a n t e n n a ,  
Figure 3-3.-  Aft equipment rack thermal shields loose at center standoff. 


There a r e  seve ra l  a reas  i n  t h e  e l e c t r i c a l  c i r c u i t r y  which could have 
caused t h e  problem. One is  t h a t  one contact  i n  t h e  safe/arm switch ( f i g -  
u re  3-6) d id  not make. The second is  t h a t  an open may have e x i s t e d  down- 
s tream of t h e  safe/arm switch,  e i t h e r  i n  t h e  so lde r  melt ing element o r  i n  
t h e  wiring back through ground. A r e s i s t a n c e  measurement i s  made across 
t h e  two p a r a l l e l  solder-melting elements p r i o r  t o  f l i g h t .  About a 3-ohm 
increase  i n  r e s i s t a n c e  was found a t  t h e  l a s t  check, This change i s  equiv- 
a l e n t  t o  about a 10-ohm inc rease  i n  one of t h e  elements which could have 
been i n d i c a t i v e  of t h i s  problem. Mechanically, t h e  only reasonable f a i l -  
ure f o r  t h i s  design would be a missing spr ing  o r  snap r i n g .  The records 
show no d i f f i c u l t i e s  o r  problems associa ted  with t h e  e n t i r e  assembly. 
Several  co r rec t ive  ac t ions  a r e  planned t o  cover a l l  reasonable possi-  
b i l i t i e s  of f a i l u r e .  These inc lude:  
a .  X-raying of l a t c h  assemblies.  
b .  Measuring t h e  c i r c u i t  r e s i s t a n c e  at Kennedy Space Center. 
c .  Adding wir ing  t o  t h e  c i r c u i t  t o  provide redundant paths through 
t h e  safe/arm switch t o  t h e  so lde r  melting elements. 
This anomaly is  open. 
3.4 REACTION CONTROL SYSTEM HELIUM REGULATOR LENCAGE 
During p ressu r i za t ion  of t h e  sys tem a t  about 95 : 00, t h e  r egu la to r  
o u t l e t  pressure  i n  system A ( f i g .  3-7) increased beyond t h e  maximum spec- 
i f i c a t i o n  limit. The normal p res su r i za t ion  i s  charac ter ized  by a sharp 
increase  from t h e  nominal pad p ressu re ,  i n  t h e  i n t e r v a l  of 1 t o  2 seconds, 
t o  t h e  normal r egu la to r  o u t l e t  pressure .  The o u t l e t  pressure  of system A ,  
a f t e r  reaching t h e  normal value of 184 p s i a ,  continued t o  r i s e  a t  approxi- 
mately 10 psi /minute,  a condit ion which c l e a r l y  ind ica ted  t h e  exis tence  of 
i n t e r n a l  leakage i n  t h e  r egu la to r  assembly. The helium leakage continued 
throughout t h e  mission,  although t h e  leakage r a t e  v a r i e d  from e s s e n t i a l l y  
zero t o  a maximum of about 1100 scc/min ( f i g s .  3-8 and 3-9). The regula- 
t o r  o u t l e t  pressure  eventual ly  increased  t o  about 237 p s i a  a t  which time 
t h e  r e l i e f  valves of system A s t a r t e d  t o  pe r iod ica l ly  r e l i e v e  t h e  pres- 
sure t o  about 232 p s i a .  
The helium regu la to r  assembly cons i s t s  of two s e r i e s  regula tors  ( f i g -  
ure 3-10). The u n i t  immediately exposed t o  t h e  high pressure source is  
designated a s  t h e  primary r egu la to r  and t h e  downstream mit  as t h e  second- 
ary r egu la to r ,  Both u n i t s  a re  i d e n t i c a l  in configurat ion with t h e  excep- 
t i o n  of shims which a re  used t o  determine t h e i r  pressure  s e t t i n g s .  The 
primary mit  i s  s e t  t o  r egu la t e  at 181 k 3  p s i a ;  t h e  secondary, a t l . 8 5  
t 3  p s i a .  
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Figure 3-6.- Lunar module steerable antenna stow-latch circuit. 
Pressure Quick 
transducer disconnect 
Explosive 
valve 
Fi l ter 
I Primary regulator 
I Secondary regulator 
To fuel tank To oxidizer tank 
Figure 3-7 .- Reaction control system pressurization system. 
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Figure 3-8.- Helium supply pressure for reaction control system during lunar stay. 
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Figure 3-10.- Lunar module reaction control system pressure regulator assembly. 
Approximntely 3 minutes a f t e r  p r e s s u r i z a t i o n ,  t h e  f i r s t  of four  pro- 
p e l l a n t  t r a n s f e r  operat ions was performed ( f i g .  3-11) . The p rope l l an t  
t r a n s f e r  operat ions were performed not only t o  lower t h e  u l lage  p ressu re ,  
but  a l s o  t o  c r e a t e  a  l a r g e r  pressurant  volume i n  t h e  propel lant  t a n k s ,  
thereby obta in ing  a  blowdown c a p a b i l i t y  f o r  expulsion of t h e  remaining 
p rope l l an t  i n  case of t h e  t o t a l  l o s s  of system A p res su r i za t ion  gas 
through t h e  r e l i e f  va lves .  
As was mentioned previous ly ,  t h e  d a t a  ind ica ted  t h a t  t h e  r egu la to r  
malfunction was an i n t e r n a l  leak  beyond s p e c i f i c a t i o n  l i m i t s .  ( s p e c i f i -  
ca t ion  value i s  20 s c c l h r ) .  I n  order  f o r  t h e  leakage through t h e  t o t a l  
assembly t o  t ake  p lace ,  a  double f a i l u r e  wi th in  t h e  assembly must e x i s t .  
The matr ix of t h e  poss ib le  leakage pa ths  i s  shown i n  t a b l e  I. A s  can be 
seen from t h e  matr ix ,  t h e r e  a r e  1 5  poss ib le  double-fai lure combinations 
which can r e s u l t  i n  t h e  anomalous condit ion observed during t h e  f l i g h t .  
Of t h e s e  poss ib le  combinations, t h e  four  involving only t h e  poppets a r e  
deemed t h e  most probable. This i s  based on t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  leakage was 
v a r i a b l e ,  i nd ica t ing  a  v a r i a t i o n  i n  t h e  leakage path.  A va r i ab le  l e a k  
pa th  i s  usual ly  associa ted  with t h e  presence of p a r t i c u l a t e  contamination 
r a t h e r  than  a  damaged O-ring. This supposi t ion i s  a l s o  supported by t h e  
f a c t  t h a t  a l l  O-rings which could have caused t h e  anomaly were v e r i f i e d  
t o  be l eak - t igh t  during Kennedy Space Center checkout. The p a r t i c u l a t e  
contamination on t h e  o the r  hand could have been i n s i d e  t h e  r egu la to r  as- 
sembly during ground t e s t s ,  but  loca ted  i n  such a  manner t h a t  it was not 
dislodged by t h e  gas flow under 1-g condit ions.  I n  a  weightless  condi- 
t i o n ,  however, t h e  contamination could have been moved by t h e  gas flow 
and deposi ted between any of t h e  poppets and t h e i r  s e a t s .  
It i s  a l s o  poss ib le  t h a t ,  upon system a c t i v a t i o n ,  t h e  i n i t i a l  pres- 
sure surge through t h e  r egu la to r  i n l e t  f i l t e r  caused f i l t e r  damage, the re -  
by introducing p a r t i c u l a t e  contamination i n t o  t h e  r egu la to r  assembly. The 
flow of t h e  pressurant  gas through t h e  r egu la to r  during t h e  mission could 
cause t h e  minute p a r t i c l e s  t o  move t o  and from t h e  poppet sea t  a r e a s ,  a  
condit ion which would cause a  change i n  t h e  leak  paths and t h e  ensuing 
leakage r a t e s .  
Instances of r egu la to r  f a i l u r e  t h a t  can be t r a c e d  t o  p a r t i c u l a t e  con- 
tamination a r e  extremely scarce .  Of some 1500 u n i t s  de l ivered ,  only a  
few were found t o  be leaking because of p a r t i c u l a t e  contamination. A l l  
of t h e  contaminated components were discovered during p r e - i n s t a l l a t i o n  
t e s t s  , The p a r t i c u l a r  component which malfunctioned was de l ivered  during 
the  f i r s t  qua r t e r  of 1966. During p r e - i n s t a l l a t i o n  t e s t s ,  it was d i s -  
covered t h a t  t h e  secondary o u t l e t  pressure  was 2  p s i  below t h e  minimum 
s p e c i f i c a t i o n  va lue ,  The un i t  was reshimmed, acceptance t e s t e d ,  and pre- 
i n s t a l l a t i o n  t e s t e d .  Subsequently, t h e  u n i t  was brazed i n t o  t h e  helium 
pressu r i za t ion  module and i n s t a l l e d  on t h e  Apollo 16 luna r  module. The 
r egu la to r  was checked t w o  more times p r i o r  t o  shipment t o  t h e  Kennedy 
Time, 1ir:min 
NOTE D I F F E R E N T  T I M E  S C A L E S  
F iyure  3-11.- Comparison of heliuri l s ~ t p p l y  ~ i r e s s ~ ~ r e  and regulator out let  
pressure fol lowing reaci ion coi i t roi  system pressur izat ion. 

Space Center. The i n i t i a l  checkou-t a t  t h e  Kennedy Space Center ind ica ted  
a s l i g h t  t r a n s i e n t  overshoot of t h e  lockup pressure of  t h e  secondary reg- 
u l a t o r .  This discrepancy was t r a c e d  t o  t h e  t e s t  se tup  and t h e  f i n a l  re-  
t e s t  of the  r egu la to r  ind ica ted  t h a t  i t s  operat ion was normal. 
A regula tor  malfunction was detec ted  on module 2 of t h e  S-IVB aux- 
i l i a r y  propulsion system. The symptoms associa ted  with t h e  malfunction 
are  not i d e n t i c a l  t o  those  of t h e  lunar  module r eac t ion  cont ro l  system, 
but the  regula tors  on both vehicles a r e  very s imi la r  and, the re fo re ,  t h e  
S-IVB anomaly may be of i n t e r e s t .  
The S-IVB malfunction occurred i n  two d i s t i n c t  s t e p s .  Regulator 
o u t l e t  pressure s h i f t e d  about 4 p s i  during t h e  system pressur i za t ion  
some 8 hours before  launch,  The p ressur i za t ion  of t h e  S-IVB system i s  
accomplished simultaneously with t h e  helium loading and i s  very gradual .  
The s h i f t  occurred when t h e  regula tor  i n l e t  pressure was about 400 p s i a .  
Af ter  t h a t ,  t h e  r egu la to r  o u t l e t  pressure remained constant  u n t i l  some 
700 seconds a f t e r  l i f t - o f f ,  when t h e  second s t e p  occurred. The pressure 
began t o  increase  a f t e r  completion of t h e  f i r s t  u l l age  f i r i n g .  The pres- 
sure r i s e  was accompanied by t h e  decrease i n  t h e  helium source pressure 
ind ica t ing  r e l i e f  valve venting.  Calculat ions i n d i c a t e  t h a t  t h e  leakage 
was a constant o r i f i c e  flow. The pressure  decay of t h e  helium b o t t l e  de- 
creased i n  proport ion t o  t h e  absolute value of t h e  source pressure ,  thus  
ver i fy ing t h a t  a constant  o r i f i c e  flow ex i s t ed .  The leakage p e r s i s t e d  
throughout t h e  d a t a  acqu i s i t ion  period.  
The most probable f a i l u r e  mode of t h e  S-IVB regu la to r s  i s  pos tu la ted  
t o  be p a r t i c u l a t e  contamination. During t h e  p ressur i za t ion  cycle ,  it could 
have caused leakage i n  t h e  primary s tage  causing t h e  secondary s t age  t o  
s t a r t  regula t ing .  During t h e  f l i g h t ,  t h e  contamination could have worked 
i t s  way i n t o  t h e  secondary s t age ,  causing t h a t  s tage  t o  l eak  a l s o .  
Exploratory t e s t s  a re  underway. 
This anomaly i s  open. 
3.5 APPARENT STICKING OF CABIN GAS RETURN VALVE 
The crew repor ted  hearing a cha t t e r ing  noise and experiencing a pul- 
s a t i n g ,  i n s u f f i c i e n t  f low i n  t h e  s u i t  c i r c u i t  a t  95:47 while configured 
t o  the  cabin mode of operat ion ( f i g ,  3-12), Data ind ica te  t h a t  t h e  cabin 
mode flow was normal a t  system ac t iva t ion  (93; 41 )  , and t h i s  was confirmed 
by t h e  crew a f t e r  t h e  mission. The pulsing and cha t t e r ing  occurred again 
a f t e r  t h e  demand regula tor  check (95 :55) and a f t e r  lunar  landing (105 :57)  
From cabin 
rater 
Secondary lithium 
Figure 3-12 .- Atmosphere ievi tal izat ion section. 
The problem w a s  t r a c e d  t o  t h e  cabin  gas r e t u r n  va lve  which apparent ly  
f a i l e d  t o  open i n  t h e  AWO p o s i t i o n ,  t hus  b locking  t h e  cabin gas from re -  
t u r n i n g  t o  t h e  s u i t  c i r c u i t .  This r e s u l t s  i n  "deadheading" of t h e  s u i t  
f an ,  thereby causing t h e  downstretm check valve t o  c h a t t e r  and p u l s a t i o n s  
due t o  t h e  small  amount of  flow drawn through t h e  suit gas d i v e r t e r  va lve  
i n  t h e  cabin p o s i t i o n .  The manual OPEN and CLOSED p o s i t i o n s  of t h e  cabin  
gas r e t u r n  valve were used f o r  t h e  remainder of  t h e  mission.  The AUTO 
p o s i t i o n  was s e l e c t e d  l a t e r  during t h e  luna r  s t a y  and opera ted  normally 
(good flow, no c h a t t e r ) .  
Since t h e  va lve  func t ioned  proper ly  upon a c t i v a t i o n  and again l a t e  
i n  t h e  l u n a r  s t a y ,  t h e  apparent  cause of t h e  problem was contamination. 
There a r e  two p o s s i b l e  a r eas  of contamination: m a t e r i a l  on t h e  i n l e t  
sc reen  o r  r e s idue  on t h e  f l a p p e r  s e a l  ( f i g .  3-13). A suspected source 
of r e s idue  i s  t h e  orange j u i c e  t h a t  leaked  from t h e  dr ink  bags. 
A l t e rna t e  procedures a r e  a v a i l a b l e  t o  assure  s u i t  c i r c u i t  flow i f  a 
malfunction should occur i n  t h e  cabin  gas r e t u r n  va lve .  Liquid e n t e r i n g  
t h e  s u i t  c i r c u i t  through t h e  cabin gas r e t u r n  va lve  should not  cause a 
f u r t h e r  problem s i n c e  it would b e  absorbed i n  t h e  l i t h i u m  hydroxide car -  
t r i d g e .  
A t e s t  w i l l  be  performed on t h e  Apollo 1 7  l u n a r  module t o  check t h e  
fo rce  needed t o  open t h e  cabin  gas r e t u r n  valve f l a p p e r  i n  t h e  AUTO pos i -  
t i o n ,  thus  inc reas ing  confidence i n  t h e  ground checkout of t h e  va lve .  
This  anomaly is  c losed .  
3.6 LOSS OF LUNAR MODULE ATTITUDE CONTROL AFTER JETTISON 
Lunar module a t t i t u d e  c o n t r o l  was l o s t  immediately a f t e r  t h e  luna r  
module was j e t t i s o n e d  from t h e  command and s e r v i c e  module at 195 :00 :12. 
The l u n a r  module was t o  be c o n t r o l l e d  between j e t t i s o n  and luna r  su r f ace  
impact ( i nc lud ing  t h e  deo rb i t  f i r i n g )  wi th  t h e  d i g i t a l  a u t o p i l o t  o f  t h e  
primary guidance system ( f i g .  3-14). Af t e r  j e t t i s o n ,  te lemet ry  showed 
t h a t  t h e  a u t o p i l o t  was proper ly  i s s u i n g  e r r o r  s i g n a l s  t o  t h e  a t t i t u d e  and 
t r a n s l a t i o n  c o n t r o l  assembly primary p reampl i f i e r s ;  however, no engine 
d r i v e r  commands were being i s s u e d  by t h e  a t t i t u d e  and t r a n s l a t i o n  c o n t r o l  
assembly, a s  i n d i c a t e d  by te lemet ry .  
Any of t h e  fol lowing condi t ions  could have caused t h e  problem ( r e f e r  
t o  f i g .  3-14): 
a. The c i r c u i t  b reaker  which provides t h e  28-volt-dc enabl ing v o l t -  
zge t o  t h e  primary preamplifiers may have c losed  nieeha_nica,ll.y but not 
e l e c t r i c a l l y ,  
Figure 3-13 .- Cabin gas return valve.  
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Figure 3-14.- Reaction control system control schematic. 
b.  The guidance c o n t r o l  switch may have f a i l e d .  
c .  The primary guidance mode c o n t r o l  switch may have f a i l e d .  
d. The i n - l i n e  f i l t e r  could have f a i l e d .  
e .  An open o r  short-to-ground may have occurred i n  t h e  spacec ra f t  
w i r ing  or  a s soc i a t ed  connectors ,  
f .  The c i r c u i t  b reaker  may have opened because of cu r r en t  loads  i n  
excess of 2 amperes. 
g. The c i r c u i t  b reaker  could have been lef ' t  open by t h e  crew. 
Review of f l i g h t  d a t a  and f a i l u r e  h i s t o r i e s  has been performed and 
t h e  fol lowing conclusions made: 
a .  A c i r c u i t  b reaker  on Apollo 1 5  f a i l e d  t o  make e l e c t r i c a l  cont inu-  
i t y  when mechanically l a t c h e d  due t o  non-conductive contaminant between 
t h e  con tac t s .  
b .  The switches i n  i tems b and c i n  t h e  preceding paragraph have 
been X-rayed and no conductive contaminants observed. The t o g g l e  switches 
have no f a i l u r e  h i s t o r y  of non-conductive contaminants.  The guidance con- 
t r o l  switch was not changed from t h e  p o s i t i o n  it was i n  during rendezvous 
and docking when t h e  primary c o n t r o l  system performed a s  expected.  
c .  Only one f a i l u r e  has  been recorded f o r  t h e  i n - l i n e  f i l t e r .  
d. Opens o r  shorts-to-ground may have occurred and a s h o r t  may have 
popped t h e  c i r c u i t  b reake r ,  bu t  it i s  un l ike ly  t h a t  such an event  occurred 
during t h i s  t ime.  
e .  The most probable cause of  t h e  problem i s  t h a t  t h e  c i r c u i t  b reake r  
which provides 28 v o l t s  t o  t h e  primary p reampl i f i e r  e i t h e r  d id  not  make 
e l e c t r i c  contac t  ( s i m i l a r  t o  Apollo 1 5 )  o r  was inadve r t en t ly  l e f t  open. 
Extensive changes t o  t h e  f l i g h t  p lan  and a t t endan t  procedure changes 
were communicated t o  t h e  crew'. The procedure changes were c o r r e c t  and 
were copied c o r r e c t l y .  I f  t h e  procedures  f o r  an engine h o t - f i r e  t e s t  had 
been r equ i r ed  by t h e  ground before  t h e  crew l e f t  t h e  l u n a r  module, an open 
c i r c u i t  b reaker  o r  a system malfunction would have been de t ec t ed .  If a 
system malfunction had occurred,  however, t h e  deo rb i t  maneuver could n o t  
have been executed,  The deo rb i t  maneuver can only be executed wi th  t h e  
primary guidance system, I f  a system malfunction had occured during t h e  
manned po r t ion  of t h e  f l i g h t ,  adequate system redundancy i s  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  
a t t i t u d e  c o n t r o l  ( f i g .  3-14), 
No c o r r e c t i v e  ac t ion  i s  r equ i r ed .  
This anomaly i s  c losed .  
3.7 ABORT GUIDANCE SYSTEM OUT-OF-PLANE VELOCITY 
ERROR LARGER THAN EXPECTED 
Abort guidance system d a t a  dur ing  descent  revea led  two abnormal con- 
d i t i o n s .  F i r s t ,  t h e  out-of -plane component of v e l o c i t y ,  when compared t o  
t h e  primary guidance system, inc reased  t o  a maximum of 28 f t / s e c  near  l u -  
nar  touchdown, Second, t h e  r o l l  ax i s  w a s  misal igned a f t e r  touchdown by 
0.47 degrees when compared t o  t h e  primary guidance system r o l l  a x i s .  Both 
of t h e s e  e r r o r s  a r e  w i th in  acceptab le  performance l i m i t s ,  bu t  they a r e  
l a r g e r  than  expected and a r e  t h e  l a r g e s t  seen on any Apollo f l i g h t .  
Figure 3-15 i s  a t ime h i s t o r y  of t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  between t h e  abor t  
guidance system and t h e  primary guidance system X-axis a t t i t u d e  r e fe rence  
during descent .  The r a p i d  e r r o r  bu i ldup  during t h e  f i r s t  2 minutes i n -  
d i c a t e s  d r i f t  r a t e s  of up t o  19 degrees p e r  hour. No reason can be g iven  
f o r  t h e s e  h igh  d r i f t  r a t e s ;  however, a change i n  t h e  X-axis gyro perform- 
ance c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  obviously took p l ace .  The s teady  d r i f t  r a t e  of 2 de- 
grees  p e r  hour dur ing  t h e  l a s t  8 minutes i s  be l i eved  t o  have been caused 
by a s h i f t  i n  a mass unbalance along t h e  X gyro s p i n  re ference  a x i s .  
D r i f t  caused by t h i s  mass unbalance w a s  a l s o  apparent  i n  t h e  d a t a  f o r  t h e  
l u n a r  su r f ace  c a l i b r a t i o n ,  due t o  g r a v i t y ,  and during a scen t ,  due t o  t h e  
as  cent  engine t h r u s t .  
The r o l l  a x i s  misalignment i s  accounted f o r  by t h e  higher-than-normal 
d r i f t  r a t e s  dur ing  descent .  
A complete review of p r e f l i g h t  d a t a  i s  being conducted t o  v e r i f y  t h a t  
t h e r e  was no evidence of a problem p r i o r  t o  launch.  Hardware malfunct ions 
wi th in  t h e  gyro w i l l  b e  hypothesized and t h e i r  e f f e c t  on d r i f t  r a t e s  w i l l  
be  modeled i n  an e f f o r t  t o  r econs t ruc t  t h e  e r r o r  curve i n  f i g u r e  3-15. 
Correc t ive  a c t i o n  i s  dependent upon completion of d e t a i l e d  ana lys i s  
This anomaly i s  open, 

4,0 GOVERNMEW FURNISHED EQTJIPMENT ANOMALIES 
4 .l MALFUNCTION OF TELEVISION CAMEM MONITOR 
I N  COMMAND MODULE 
The command module t e lev i s ion  camera monitor exhibited hor izonta l  
l i n e s  during t h e  i n i t i a l  usage. This condition cleared and performance 
of t h e  monitor was normal u n t i l  t h e  press conference t e l e ca s t  during t h e  
t ransear th  coast phase. A t  t h a t  time, the  monitor had the  same horizon- 
tal l i n e s  reported during t he  i n i t i a l  usage, followed by a complete l o s s  
of t h e  p ic tu re .  The hori  zontal-hold control  adjustment would not correct  
t h e  hor izonta l  l i n e  condition. The monitor was turned o f f  fo r  approxi- 
mately 5 minutes, and then turned back on, a f t e r  which the  monitor pic- 
t u r e  was normal. 
Since t he  downlink t e lev i s ion  video s ignal  was not a f fec ted ,  t h e  
malfunction has been i so l a t ed  t o  the  monitor and associated cable. The 
system i s  scheduled t o  be t es ted .  
This anomaly i s  open. 
4.2 OXYGEN PURGE SYSTEM ANTENNA BROKE 
Following ingress  a f t e r  t h e  second extravehicular  a c t i v i t y ,  t h e  crew 
reported t h a t  approximately 2 inches had been broken of f  the  t i p  of t h e  
antenna on t he  Commander's oxygen purge system ( f i g  4-1). The antenna 
had inadvertently been l e f t  unstowed while ingressing and it i s  believed 
t h a t  t h e  antenna was broken when it struck t he  ascent propulsion system 
engine cover as t he  Commander was coming through t he  hatch. 
The d e s i r a b i l i t y  of leaving t h e  antennas stowed a t  a3.1 times i s  being 
invest igated,  and t he  f e a s i b i l i t y  of carrying a spare antenna i s  being con- 
sidered. 
This anomaly i s  open. 
Figure 4-1.- Damaged antenna on oxygen purge system. 
4.3 EDERIMENTAL GAS/WATER SEPARATOR LEAKAGE 
The experimental gas/water septuator  was cracked m-d leaking;  the re -  
fo re ,  it was not used. Pos t f l igh t  examination showed t h a t  t h e  f r a c t u r e  
occurred a t  t h e  base of t h e  threaded sec t ion  of t h e  l i d  ( f i g .  4-2) which 
i s  made of p lex ig lass .  
The design considerat ions a re  being assessed. 
This anomaly i s  open. 
4.4 WRIST DISCONNECTS DIFFICULT TO ROTATE 
After  exposure t o  t h e  lunar  surface  environment, t h e  wr i s t  r i n g  d i s -  
connects on t h e  Commander's and t h e  Lunar Module P i l o t ' s  s u i t s  were hard 
t o  r o t a t e  t o  t h e  locked pos i t ion  and, once locked, were very d i f f i c u l t  t o  
r o t a t e  out of  t h e  locked pos i t ion .  Lunar s o i l  contamination and l o s s  o f  
lubr i can t  a r e  suspected as  t h e  causes o f  t h i s  problem. 
The wrist disconnect a t taches  t h e  glove t o  t h e  s u i t  s leeve ( f i g .  4-3) 
and i s  covered by a gaunt le t  on t h e  glove. The gaunt le t  i s  loose f i t t i n g  
around t h e  s u i t  s leeve  and d i r t  can get  i n t o  t h e  wr i s t  disconnect.  Very 
c lose  to lerances  between t h e  s l i d i n g  surfaces  a r e  inherent  i n  t h e  design. 
This was d e l i b e r a t e  t o  make it impossible t o  acc identa l ly  unlock t h e  w r i s t  
disconnects.  With these  design condit ions,  a very small amount of contam- 
ina t ion  can adversely a f f e c t  t h e  r o t a t i o n  of t h e  locking mechanism. 
Pos t f l igh t  inspect ion  and analys is  of  t h e  wrist disconnects w i l l  be  
performed. A glove design change which w i l l  a f fo rd  b e t t e r  p ro tec t ion  
from contamination i s  under considerat ion.  
This anomaly i s  open. 
4.5 COMMUNICATIONS CARRIER MICROPHONE AND EARPHONE PROBLEMS 
During t h e  communications check p r i o r  t o  t h e  f i r s t  ext ravehicular  
a c t i v i t y ,  t h e  microphone audio s i g n a l  from t h e  Lunar Module P i l o t  ' s head- 
s e t  was too weak t o  operate the  voice-operated keying c i r c u i t r y  i n  h i s  
ext ravehicular  communications system. This was a t t r i b u t e d  t o  a loose  t i p  
on one of t h e  communications c a r r i e r  headset microphone booms p lus  orange 
ju i ce  blockage of  t h e  o the r  microphone boom (fig 4-4). P o s t f l i g h t  analy- 
s i s  w i l l  be performed t o  determine t h e  cause of  t h e  Loose microphone boom 
t i p ,  The orange ju i ce  blockage w i l l  be evaluated ads a Ju ice  bag problem, 
Figure 4-2, - Gas/water separator fai lure. 
Pu l I to re lease 
k 
love seal 
lock 
Section ihrough r ing ( typical-eight places) 
Figure 4-3 .- Wr is t  disconnect. 
Figure 4-4. - Communications carr ier .  
During t h e  t r a n s e a r t h  coas t  phase,  t h e  Lunar Module P i l o t  a l s o  exper- 
ienced i n t e r m i t t e n t  opera t ion  of  h i s  communications c a r r i e r  headset  e m -  
phone c i r c u i t ,  This condi t ion  was c l e a r e d  by f l e x i n g  t h e  constant-wear 
garment harness  near  t h e  21-pin connector .  P o s t f l i g h t  t e s t s  w i l l  be  made 
t o  reproduce t h e  i n t e r m i t t e n t  condi t ion  i n  t h e  communications c a r r i e r  um- 
b i l i c a l  and c o n t r o l  head, t h e  cons tan t  wear garment harness ,  and t h e  com- 
munications c a r r i e r  headset .  
This  anomaly i s  open. 
4.6 COMMANDER'S AND LUNAR MODULE PILOT 'S CUFF GAGE 
READINGS DIFFERENT DURING TRANSEARTH EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITY 
The Commander's cuff gage i n d i c a t e d  a d i f f e r e n t  p re s su re  from t h a t  
of t h e  Lunar Module P i l o t  during t h e  t r a n s e a r t h  ex t r aveh icu la r  a c t i v i t y .  
The Commander's gage ind ica t ed  approximately 3.5 p s i a ,  whereas t h e  L u n a  
Module P i l o t ' s  gage ind ica t ed  approximately 3.9 p s i a .  During t h i s  p e r i o d ,  
t h e  s u i t  loop  p re s su re  was i n d i c a t i n g  4.6 p s i a ,  a value which i s  considered 
t o  be erroneous ( s e e  sec .  2 .13) .  The normal s u i t  p ressure  should have been 
approximately 3.8 p s i a .  During t h e  s u i t  i n t e g r i t y  check, t h e  cuff  gages 
i n d i c a t e d  approximately t h e  same. 
The cuf f  gage i s  a bellows-actuated aneroid-type device which i n d i -  
c a t e s  d i f f e r e n t i a l .  p ressure  and has an accuracy o f  t 0 . l  p s i a .  The gage 
opening t o  ambient pressure  i s  p ro t ec t ed  by a screen .  
P o s t f l i g h t  t e s t s  o f  t h e  gages t o  d a t e  show t h a t  t h e  two s u i t  gages 
a r e  reading 3.96 and 4.03 p s i a  compared wi th  an a c t u a l  p re s su re  of 4.0 
p s i a .  Fu r the r  a n a l y s i s  w i l l  be performed. 
This anomaly i s  open. 
4.7 SWOLLEN EXTRAVEHICULAR MOBILITY UNIT MAINTENANCE KIT 
The ex t r aveh icu la r  mobi l i ty  u n i t  maintenance k i t  stowed i n  t h e  command 
module was swollen t o  about t h r e e  t imes t h e  s i z e  of t h e  k i t  c a r r i e d  i n  t h e  
l u n a r  module. The k i t s  a r e  i d e n t i c a l  i n  conf igura t ion .  The crew r e p o r t e d  
t h a t  t h e  v i s o r  c leaning  and an t i - fog  pad bags were pressur ized ,  causing 
t h e  swollen cond i t i on .  These bags a r e  requi red  t o  be vacuum packed t o  
prevent  swel l ing .  Three bag assemblies are c a r r i e d  i n  each k i t .  
The maintenance k i t  w i l l  be examined. 
This  a~orna-ly i s  open, 
5.0 LUNAR SURFACE EXPERIbENT EQUIPMEXT AlJOMBLIES 
5 . 1  HEAT FLOW EXPERIMENT CABLE BROKE 
The Commander's l e g s  became entangled i n  t h e  hea t  flow experiment 
cable  near  t h e  c e n t r a l  s t a t i o n  and h i s  movements r e s u l t e d  i n  t h e  cable  
breaking at t h e  connector t o  t h e  c e n t r a l  s t a t i o n  ( a t  t h e  connector board 
so lde r  j o i n t s )  ; however, t h e  c e n t r a l  s t a t i o n  d i d  not  move. Loss o f  t h e  
connection t o  t h e  c e n t r a l  s t a t i o n  r e s u l t e d  i n  l o s s  o f  t h e  hea t  f low ex- 
periment.  
The h e a t  flow experiment i s  stowed on subpackage no. 2. Upon a r r i v a l  
a t  t h e  Apollo l u n a r  su r f ace  experiments package deployment s i t e ,  t h e  ex- 
periment i s  removed from t h e  subpackage and t h e  e l e c t r i c a l  r ibbon cable  
i s  connected t o  t h e  c e n t r a l  s t a t i o n  by an Astromate connector ( f i g .  5,-1). 
The cable  i s  bonded and so ldered  t o  a p r i n t e d  c i r c u i t  boasd which i s  
clamped i n  a connector .  The cable-to-board j o i n t  i s  r e in fo rced  by two 
t o  four  t h i cknesses  o f  0.5-mil Kapton t a p e .  
P u l l  t e s t s  performed on t h e  cable/Astromate connector conf igura t ion  
i n d i c a t e  t h e  s t r e n g t h  a t  t h e  cable/board i n t e r f a c e  was 31  pounds. A mod- 
i f i e d  j o i n t  assembly ~ ~ h i c h  inc ludes  a s t r a i n  r e l i e f  provis ion  i s  under 
t e s t  ( f i g .  5-2). 
This  anomaly i s  open. 
5.2 SPIKE ON MORTAR PACKAGE D I D  NOT DEPLOY 
The lanyard  pu l l ed  t h e  r e l e a s e  p ins  from t h r e e  o f  t h e  f o u r  spr ing-  
loaded hinged sp ikes  and t h e s e  t h r e e  deployed normally. The r e l e a s e  p i n  
f o r  spike 3 was ben t  and jammed so t h a t  it could not b e  pu l l ed  ou t .  
The mortar  package p a l l e t  assembly inc ludes  fou r  7-inch-long sp ikes  
(fig. 5-3) which deploy normal t o  t h e  p a l l e t  when t h e  r e l e a s e  p i n s  a r e  
removed. A sp ike  can be  deployed manually by shear ing  t h e  p in ;  however, 
t h e  crew was not  adequately t r a i n e d  t o  implement t h i s  opera t ion .  When 
t h e  p a l l e t  i s  p roper ly  pos i t i oned ,  t h e  sp ikes  a r e  pressed  i n t o  t h e  l u n a r  
sur face  t o  provide a d d i t i o n a l  s t a b i l i t y  t o  t h e  platform. 
Tests  and analyses  performed during t h e  development of t h e  p a l l e t  
assembly i n d i c a t e  t h a t  t h r e e  deployed sp ikes  a r e  adequate t o  provide s t a -  
b i l i t y ,  The Apollo 16 p a l l e t  w a s  emplaced with t h e  t h r e e  sp ikes  pressed  
i n t o  t h e  l u n a r  s u r f a c e ,  and t h e  crew repor ted  t h e  complete mortar pack- 
age asnil p a l l e t  assembly tlras sta,bl.e, 

F igu re  5-2. - Modified connector  assembly. 
Figure  5-3.- Botton~ view o f  ac t ive  seismic exper in~ent i ~ ~ o u t a r  pacl<aye pa l le t .  
No c o r r e c t i v e  a c t i o n  i s  r equ i r ed  a s  t h e  experiment i s  not scheduled 
f o r  another  mission.  
This  anomaly i s  closed.  
5.3 MORTAR BOX ROLL ANGLE TELEMETRY INDICATED OFF-SCALE HIGH 
The t e l eme t ry  i n d i c a t i o n  f o r  t h e  r o l l  angle  of t h e  mortar box w a s  
off-scale  high. The sensor l i m i t  i s  lt15 degrees.  However, t h e  bubble 
i n  t h e  l e v e l i n g  dev ice ,  a s  observed by t h e  crew, i nd ica t ed  t h a t  t h e  mor- 
tar box was l e s s  t h a n  5 degrees o f f  l e v e l  i n  combined p i t c h  and r o l l .  
The p i t c h  angle  t e l eme t ry  i n d i c a t i o n  w a s  minus 2.3 degrees.  Photography 
confirms t h a t  t h e  alignment w a s  s a t i s f a c t o r y .  
The sensor  func t ions  as  a p a r t  o f  a vo l t age  d iv ide r  i n  an o s c i l l a t o r  
c i r c u i t .  An of f - sca le  high output  could r e s u l t  from a f a i l u r e  of any com- 
ponent which i n t e r c e p t s  t h e  o s c i l l a t o r .  A t  t h e  time t h e  r o l l  sensor  was 
i n s t a l l e d  on t h e  experiment,  proper  ope ra t ion  w a s  v e r i f i e d  over a tilt 
angle o f  +5 degrees.  
The of f -sca le  high measurement was t h e  r e s u l t  o f  a component f a i l u r e  
i n  t h e  sensor  c i r c u i t .  The experiment i s  no t  scheduled f o r  another  m i s -  
s i on .  
This  anomaly i s  c losed .  
5.4 COSMIC RAY DETECTOR PANEL 4 SHADE 
PARTIALLY DEPLOYED AND LANYARD BROKE 
The Comander p u l l e d  t h e  red-r ing lanyard  ( f i g .  5-4) t o  s h i f t  t h e  
shade i n  pane l  4.  The shade s h i f t e d  only 1 inch  ( i t  should have moved 
about 3.5 i n c h e s ) ,  and t h e  lanyard  broke.  
A movable plat inum shee t  covers t h e  t o p  h a l f  o f  panel  4 dur ing  t r a n s -  
l una r  f l i g h t  and u n t i l  a f t e r  t h e  r ad io i so tope  thermoelec t r ic  genera tor  i s  
removed from t h e  a r e a  dur ing  l u n a r  su r f ace  opera t ions .  The red-r ing l a n -  
yard  extends from t h e  bottom o f  pane l  1, behind panels  1, 2 ,  3, and 4 ,  and 
i s  a t t ached  t o  a s l i d e  assembly on t h e  end of t h e  movable plat inum shee t .  
When t h e  lanyard  i s  pu l l ed  down, t h e  plat inum sheet  i s  pu l l ed  up over  a 
r o l l e r  at t h e  t o p  of pane l  4 ,  exposing a d d i t i o n a l  de t ec to r s .  
&amination o f  t h e  r e t u n e d  assembly showed t h a t  four  screws i n  t h e  
s l i d e  f r a ~ e  xtended too far,  r e s d t i n g  i n  about 0,005-inch i n t e r f e r e n c e .  
This c a w e d  t h e  shade to become jzmrd, 
Ficjiire 5-4. - f i l l  ly  cfeployeci cosi- i~ic ray detector experiment. 
The assembly performed s a t i s f a c t o r i l y  when deployed dur ing  t h e  pre-  
f l i g h t  fit and func t ion  check. However, it was necessary t o  r e f u r b i s h  
t h e  hardware a f t e r  t h i s  ope ra t ion ,  and t h e  screw cleaxances may have 
changed as a r e s u l t  of t h e  refurbishment.  
This experiment i s  no t  scheduled f o r  another  mission. 
This  anomaly i s  c losed .  
5.5 VERTICAL STAFF OF GNOMON SEPARATED FROM L;EG ASSEMBLY 
When t h e  gnomon ( f i g .  5 - 5 )  w a s  be ing  unstowed from i t s  stowage bag  
dur ing  t h e  second ex t r aveh icu la r  a c t i v i t y ,  t h e  l e g  assembly remained i n  
t h e  bag, and t h e  v e r t i c a l  s t a f f  assembly and i n n e r  gimbal p a r t s  came o u t  
s epa ra t e ly .  The l e g  assembly, because of i t s  c o l o r  s c a l e ,  was used dur- 
i ng  t h e  r e s t  of t h e  luna r  su r f ace  photographic opera t ions .  
The v e r t i c a l  s t a f f l i n n e r  gimbal bear ings  a r e  he ld  i n  p lace  by two 
p ivo t  screws i n  t h e  i n n e r  gimbal. I n  add i t i on  t o  t h e  l o c t i t e  i n  t h e  
t h r e a d s ,  t h e s e  screws a r e  cap t ive  wi th in  t h e  ou te r  gimbal. The i n n e r  
gimbal/outer  gimbal bearings a r e  h e l d  i n  p l ace  by two p ivot  screws i n  
t h e  o u t e r  gimbal, I n  case  o f  a l o c t i t e  f a i l u r e ,  t h e s e  screws could back 
out  under v i b r a t i o n  condi t ions ,  and allow t h e  s t a f f  and inne r  gimbal t o  
come ou t .  
Screw r e t e n t i o n  w i l l  be  assured  on o the r  gnomons. 
This anomaly i s  open. 
5.6 DOCUMENTED SAMPLE BAG DISPENSERS FELL OFF 
70-MM CAMERA BRACKETS 
During t h e  geology a c t i v i t i e s  on t h e  l u n a r  su r f ace ,  t h e  bag d ispenser  
assemblies  r epea t ed ly  f e l l  o f f  t h e  bracke ts  on t h e  70-mm cameras. 
The d ispenser  i s  mounted on an adapter  ( f i g .  5 - 6 )  which i s  i n s e r t e d  
i n  t h e  r ing-s ight  t ee - s lo t  b racke t  on t h e  camera. The adapter- to- tee s l o t  
i n t e r f a c e  i s  ho r i zon ta l  and depends on spr ings  i n  t h e  t e e  s l o t  t o  ho ld  t h e  
adapter  i n  t h e  l a t c h e d  p o s i t i o n .  This l a t c h i n g  method i s  inadequate.  
The adapter  i s  being redesigned so  a s  t o  provide a p o s i t i v e  lock  i n  
t h e  i n s t a l l e d  posi-Lion. 
This momaly i .s open, 
Figtrre 5-5 .- Gnomon assen~b ly  .
Figure 5-6 .- Sample bag dispenser retention. 
5.7 SCREWS AND HOLDING R I N G  CAME OFF ONE OF THE 
DOCUMENTED SAMPLE BAG DISPENSERS 
The crew found t h a t  one o f  t h e  documented sample bag d ispensers  had 
come apa r t  when it was unstowed. The bags were s e t  a s ide  and used l a t e r  
without t h e  d i spense r  assembly. 
The d ispenser  assembly i s  h e l d  toge the r  by t h r e e  f la t -head  screws 
( f i g .  5-7) which a r e  r e t a i n e d  by s t ak ing  t o  t h e  b racke t .  The use  of l o c -  
t i t e  has not  been permi t ted  because o f  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  sample contami- 
na t ion .  
I n  t h e  case  of  t h i s  one assembly, t h e  s t ak ing  was apparent ly  improper 
and d i d  not  r e t a i n  t h e  screws. Dispensers f o r  Apollo 17  a r e  t o  b e  r e c a l l e d  
f o r  reaf f i rn ia t ion  of  adequate s t ak ing .  
This anomaly i s  open. 
5.8 SAMPLE COLTLEXTION BAG FELL OFF THE 
PORTABLE LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM TOOL CARRIER 
During l u n a r  sur face  ope ra t ions ,  t h e  Commander's sample c o l l e c t i o n  
bag came loose  from t h e  po r t ab l e  l i f e  support system t o o l  c a r r i e r  s e v e r a l  
t imes and f e l l  o f f  once. 
The sample c o l l e c t i o n  bag e s s e n t i a l l y  c o n s i s t s  of  a Teflon bag on a 
meta l  frame ( f i g .  5-8). The bag opening i s  covered by a Teflon l i d  on a 
hinged metal  frame. Attached t o  t h e  metal  frame on one s i d e  of t h e  bag,  
about 2 inches  below t h e  l i d ,  i s  a 318-inch-wide s t a i n l e s s  s t e e l  s t r a p  
wi th  o f f s e t s  t o  accomodate t h e  two hooks on t h e  t o o l  c a r r i e r .  About 1 
inch from t h e  bottom o f  t h e  same s i d e  i s  a 1-inch-wide Teflon band, sewn 
t o  t h e  bag, wi th  an o f f s e t  loop approximately 1 inch by 5 inches t o  ac- 
comodate t h e  Velcro s t r a p  *om t h e  bottom of  t h e  t o o l  carrr ier .  The Velcro 
s t r a p ,  when t i g h t e n e d  down, keeps t h e  bag from f l o a t i n g  o r  bouncing o f f  
t h e  hooks. During t h e  luna r  roving  veh ic l e  ope ra t ions ,  t h e  Velcro s t r a p  
sometimes loosened so t h a t  t h e  bag could come o f f  t h e  hooks. 
Changes under cons idera t ion  inc lude  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of adding a  
keeper t o  t h e  hooks, 
This anomaly i s  open, 

Figure 5-8.- Sample co l l ec t i o~ i  bay oil portable l i f e  support system tool carrier 
5,9  LUNAR SURFACE ULTFLAVIOLET C A l a K A  AZIMUTH 
ADJUSTMENT BECAME MORE DIFFICULT 
The azimuth r i n g  adjustment was d i f f i c u l t  t o  operate and became pro- 
g ress ive ly  harder t o  move with each adjustment. 
To adjus t  t h e  azimuth t o  t h e  proper d i a l  reading, t h e  camera i s  ro- 
t a t e d  on a 12.5-inch-diameter bal l-bearing r ing  which i s  lubr ica ted  with 
s i l i c o n e  grease ( f i g .  5-9). The camera r e s t s  on t h i s  bearing and i s  re-  
t a ined  i n  pos i t ion  by a t h r u s t  bearing ( b a l l )  on t h e  center  shaf't. Nei- 
t h e r  bearing i s  sealed;  however, t h e  crew observed t h a t  t h e r e  was no in -  
d ica t ion  of dust on t h e  bearing.  Extra length of ba t t e ry  cable ,  which 
provides take-up between t h e  main frame and the  r o t a t i n g  camera, i s  con- 
t a i n e d  i n  th ree  tu rns  i n  t h e  cable trunk.  The crew reported t h a t  t h e  
cable became s t i f f  i n  t h e  lunar  environment, which would add t o  t h e  re -  
s i s t ance  of t h e  azimuth ro ta t ion .  The camera was operated i n  t h e  shade 
t o  maintain proper f i lm and e lec t ron ics  temperatures. 
Environmental e f f e c t s  on t h e  bearings,  lubr ican t s ,  and cable are  be- 
ing inves t igated .  
This anomaly i s  open. 
Ficji1i.e 5-9 . -  Far i i l t rav ia ie t  cai11er.a. 
6 , l  MAPPING CMM EXTENDIRETRACT TIMES WERE: ABNORMALLY LONG 
The f i r s t  mapping camera ex tens ion  was normal, b u t  t h e  r e t r a c t i o n  r e -  
qu i r ed  2 minutes and 54 seconds. The normal t ime f o r  ex tens ion  o r  r e t r a c t -  
i o n  i s  approximately 1 minute and 20 seconds. The second and t h i r d  exten- 
s i o n s  and r e t r a c t i o n s  r equ i r ed  about 3 minutes,  bu t  t h e  f o u r t h  r e t r a c t i o n  
and f i f t h  ex tens ion  were both normal a t  1 minute and 18 seconds. The f i f t h  
( f i n a l )  r e t r a c t i o n  t ime w a s  1 minute and 34 seconds. 
This anomaly i s  s i m i l a r  t o  t h e  Apollo 1 5  problem i n  t h a t  t h e  t imes of 
t h e  f i r s t  extension and r e t r a c t i o n  were normal and a l l  subsequent t imes 
were excess ive ,  with some i n  excess  of 4 minutes.  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  Apollo 
1 5  camera would not  r e t r a c t  a f t e r  t h e  f i n a l  (15 th )  deployment. Subsequent 
i n v e s t i g a t i o n s  d i d  not  i s o l a t e  a probable cause of t h a t  anomaly but  d i d  
d i s c l o s e  a def ic iency  i n  t h e  technique  of applying t h e  dry f i l m  l u b r i c a n t  
t o  t h e  deployment mechanism d r i v e  screw. As a precaut ionary  measure, t h e  
Apollo 16 d r ive  screw was c l e a r e d  of i t s  dry f i l m  l u b r i c a n t  and l u b r i c a t e d  
with t h e  s i l i c o n e  l u b r i c a n t  t h a t  i s  used i n  a l l  bear ings  i n  t h e  camera and 
deployment mechanism, 
Deployment r a i l s  a t tached  t o  t h e  bottom of t h e  camera s l i d e  through 
bal l -bushings t h a t  a r e  p a r t  o f  t h e  deployment mechanism ( f i g .  6-1).  De- 
ployment of t h e  camera i s  accomplished by t h e  d r ive  screw t u r n i n g  wi th in  
t h e  d r ive  n u t ,  which i s  b o l t e d  t o  t h e  camera. F r i c t i o n  i n  t h i s  screw-nut 
d r i v e  i s  minimized through t h e  use of r e c i r c u l a t i n g  streams of b a l l  bear-  
ings  r i d i n g  between t h e  th reads  of t h e  nut and screw. 
%TO redundant motors,  each capable of deploying t h e  camera should t h e  
o t h e r  f a i l ,  power t h e  d r i v e  screw v i a  a d r ive  t r a i n  cons i s t i ng  of c l u t c h e s ,  
gear ing ,  and a "no-back" device t h a t  locks t h e  deployment mechanism when 
power i s  removed from t h e  motors.  The motors, c lu tches  , and most of t h e  
gear ing  a r e  contained wi th in  t h e  gear  box. Two c lu tches  a r e  used,  one 
wi th  each motor. Thei r  design i s  such t h a t ,  should a motor s e i z e ,  i t s  
c lu t ch  w i l l  decouple from t h e  d r i v e  t r a i n .  The c lu tches  conta in  bear ings  
t h a t  a r e  l u b r i c a t e d  wi th  a r i & u r e  of s i l i c o n e  o i l  and g rease .  It i s  pos- 
s i b l e  t h a t  t h i s  l u b r i c a n t  may b e  t r a n s f e r r i n g ,  by migra t ion  o r  ou tgass ing ,  
t o  t h e  f r i c t i o n  su r f aces  of t h e  c l u t c h e s .  
A re-evaluat ion of t h e  e n t i r e  deployment mechanism design i s  i n  pro- 
g r e s s .  Tes ts  t o  determine t h e  e f f e c t  of l ub r i can t ' con tamina t ion  of c lu t ch  
f r i c t i o n  sur faces  w i l l  be  performed. 
T h i s  anomaly i s  open, 

6-2 MAPPING CAMERA STELLAR GLARE: SHIELD FAILED TO RETP&CT 
The Command Module P i l o t  observed t h a t  t h e  g l a r e  s h i e l d  f o r  t h e  s t e l l a r  
camera was jammed aga ins t  t h e  h a n d r a i l  p a r a l l e l i n g  t h e  s c i e n t i f i c  i n s t r u -  
ment module bay ( f i g .  6-2) during t h e  t r a n s e a r t h  ex t r aveh icu la r  a c t i v i t y .  
I n  t h e  16-mrn photography of t h e  ex t r aveh icu la r  a c t i v i t y ,  t h e  outermost edge 
of t h e  fo ld ing  t i p  of t h e  g l a r e  s h i e l d  i s  v i s i b l e  above t h e  h a n d r a i l ,  t h e r e -  
by s u b s t a n t i a t i n g  t h e  P i l o t ' s  observa t ion  t h a t  t h e  g l a r e  s h i e l d  was i n  t h e  
ful ly-extended p o s i t i o n  a s  shown i n  f i g u r e  6-2. 
S c i e n t i f i c  instrument  module bay photographs taken  from t h e  l u n a r  mod- 
u l e  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  t h e  g l a r e  s h i e l d  was proper ly  r e t r a c t e d  a t  rendezvous; 
t h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  f a i l u r e  t o  r e t r a c t  occurred a t  t h e  t h i r d ,  f o u r t h ,  o r  f i f t h  
( l a s t )  camera r e t r a c t i o n .  A pre l iminary  review of t h e  s t e l l a r  f i l m  i n d i -  
c a t e s  t h a t  t h i s  anomaly d i d  not  a f f e c t  t h e  s t e l l a r  photography. 
Glare s h i e l d  deployment i s  accomplished by a  rack-and-pinion mechanism 
t h a t  i s  connected by gear ing  t o  a rack on t h e  camera deployment mechanism 
( f i g .  6-1).  A s  t h e  camera i s  deployed from t h e  s c i e n t i f i c  instrument  mod- 
u l e  bay, t h e  g l a r e  s h i e l d  is  au tomat ica l ly  extended outward from t h e  s t e l -  
l a r  camera. The g l a r e  s h i e l d  reaches f u l l  ex tens ion  o r  r e t r a c t i o n  be fo re  
t h e  camera i s  completely deployed o r  r e t r a c t e d ;  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h e r e  i s  a  
c lu t ch  i n  t h e  g l a r e  s h i e l d  d r ive  t r a i n  which s l i p s  a f t e r  t h e  g l a r e  s h i e l d  
i s  f u l l y  extended o r  r e t r a c t e d .  The s l ippage  cont inues u n t i l  t h e  camera 
deployment o r  r e t r a c t i o n  i s  complete. The c lu t ch  a l s o  func t ions  a s  a  
s a f e t y  device t o  preclude i n t e r f e r e n c e  wi th  camera deployment i n  t h e  event 
of a  g l a r e  s h i e l d  ex tens ion  malfunct ion.  
Since t h e  c lu t ch  i s  s i m i l a r  i n  design t o  t h e  c lu t ches  used i n  t h e  map- 
ping camera deployment mechanism, an i n v e s t i g a t i o n  i s  being performed t o  
determine e f f e c t s  of migra t ion  of l u b r i c a n t  t o  t h e  c l u t c h  f r i c t i o n  sur -  
f aces .  
This anomaly i s  open. 
6 . 3  LASER ALTIMETER OUTPUT POWER DEGRADED 
The l a s e r  a l t i m e t e r  performed normally during i t s  f i r s t  ope ra t ing  per- 
i o d  - 4 1  minutes dur ing  l u n a r  revolu t ions  3 and 4. Evidence of l a s e r  deg- 
r ada t ion  began t o  appear e a r l y  i n  t h e  second opera t ing  per iod  ( r evo lu t ion  
1 6 ) .  The pulse  forming network vol tage  c o n t r o l l e r  began s tepping  t o  v o l t -  
age p o s i t i o n  1 ( s t e p  0 i s  t h e  i n i t i a l  s e t t i n g ) ,  and t h e  l a s e r  output power, 
Figure 6-2. - Mockup photograph of glare shield handrai I. 
when i n  s t e p  0 ,  was occas iona l ly  t o o  low f o r  ranging - as manifested by 
a l t i t u d e  readings  of zero meters and an overflowing range counter .  For 
t h i s  pe r iod ,  a l t i t u d e  d a t a  v a l i d i t y  was about 68 pe rcen t ;  i . e . ,  approxi- 
mately 32 percent  of t h e  d a t a  was "zero". 
The degradat ion r a t e  appeared t o  be r a t h e r  cons tan t  during t h e  next  
t h r e e  opera t ing  pe r iods ,  with vo l t age  s t e p  4 appearing near  t h e  end of t h e  
f i f t h  per iod  ( r e v o l u t i o n  47) .  During t h e  s i x t h  ope ra t ing  per iod  (revolu-  
t i o n  6 0 ) ,  t h e  degradat ion appeared t o  a c c e l e r a t e  and t h e  pulse  forming ne t -  
work vol tage  c o n t r o l l e r  reached s t e p  5 ,  t h e  h ighes t  a v a i l a b l e  s t e p ,  by t h e  
end of t h i s  run.  I n  s t e p  5 ,  maximum vol tage  i s  de l ive red  t o  t h e  flashlamps 
which "pump" t h e  l a s e r  ruby. During t h e  l a s t  scheduled opera t ing  pe r iod  
( r evo lu t ion  6 3 ) ,  l a s e r  output  degraded t o  t h e  po in t  t h a t  no f u r t h e r  a l t i -  
tude  da t a  were obta ined .  
There were approximately 2400 l a s e r  opera t ions  ( f i r i n g s  ) during t h e  
mission. The l a s e r  ou tput  appeared t o  degrade more r ap id ly  than  during 
t h e  Apollo 15  mission ( f i g u r e  6-3) but  was compensated by t h e  a c t i o n  of 
t h e  pulse  forming network vol tage  c o n t r o l l e r  added f o r  t h i s  purpose a s  a 
r e s u l t  of t h e  Apollo 1 5  anomaly. The pu l se  forming network cons i s t s  of 
a  l a s e r  power s t a t u s  sensor  (photodiode)  l o c a t e d  i n s i d e  t h e  l a s e r  module 
and a s soc i a t ed  c i r c u i t r y  t o  i nc rease  t h e  output of t h e  pu l se  forming ne t -  
work power supply i f  t h e  sensed l a s e r  power i s  lower t han  a  p re -e s t ab l i shed  
threshold .  
Compensation was s u f f i c i e n t  u n t i l  t h e  l a s t  40 minutes of t h e  f i n a l  
scheduled ope ra t ing  pe r iod .  Af t e r  t h i s  t ime ,  l a s e r  output  was apparent ly  
t o o  low f o r  ranging aga ins t  t h e  s u n l i t  l una r  su r f ace .  One consequence of 
t h e  pulse  forming network c o n t r o l l e r  opera t ion  was some l o s s  of a l t i t u d e  
d a t a  on a l t e r n a t e  l a s e r  f i r i n g s ;  t h e r e f o r e ,  d a t a  v a l i d i t y  was only about 
70 percent  during most of t h i s  mission.  Had t h e  c o n t r o l l e r  not been added 
t o  t h i s  u n i t ,  t h e  amount of v a l i d  d a t a  obtained would have been s i g n i f i -  
can t ly  l e s s .  An e s t ima te  of t h e  d a t a  t h a t  would have been obta ined  i s  
shown i n  f i g u r e  6-3. The c o n t r o l l e r  opera tes  t o  i nc rease  input  power t o  
t h e  l a s e r  i f  t h e  l a s e r  output  on t h e  preceding opera t ion  was low, and t o  
decrease input  i f  t h e  output was high.  It appears t h a t  t h e  th re sho ld  may 
have been low, o r  t h e  vol tage  s t eps  t o o  l a r g e ,  so  t h a t  inadequate output  
was obtained on t h e  lower s t e p ,  r e s u l t i n g  i n  l o s s  of a l t i t u d e  da t a .  This 
was p a r t i c u l a r l y  t r u e  on i l l umina ted  po r t ions  of t h e  luna r  sur face  where 
background radiance decreases  r ece ive r  s e n s i t i v i t y .  
The l a s e r  module was processed i n  t h e  same way, with t h e  new type  of 
bearing and o t h e r  re f inements ,  as  t h e  module i n  t h e  d e l t a  q u a l i f i c a t i o n  
t e s t .  This  t e s t  was conducted i n  a  vac-awn f o r  220 hours with opera t ion  
on a  simulated rrrission t i rnel ine f o r  50.5 hours .  T o t a l  opera t ions  exceeded 
9000 f i r i n g s  and t h e  vol tage  c o n t r o l l e r  had reached s t e p  4 a t  t h e  end of 
t h e  Les t ,  S imi la r  performance was expected of t h e  Apollo 15 l a s e r ,  The 
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Figure 6-3.- Laser degradation versus operating time 
number of prelaunch opera t ions  of' t h e  Apollo 16 l a s e r  was pvrposely r e -  
s t r i c t e d  t o  conserve l i f e ;  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  r a p i d  degradat.ion could not  be  
d iscerned  p r e f l i g h t .  
The p l o t s  of d a t a  va l - id i ty  versus opera t ing  t ime i n  f i g u r e  6-3 a r e  
approxlmate i n  t h a t  t h e  e f f e c t s  of l a s e r  module temperature and l u n a r  sur -  
f ace  i l l umina t ion  have been averaged ou t .  During t h e  f i r s t  11 hours of 
l a s e r  opera t ion  during Apollo 1 5 ,  t h e  command and s e r v i c e  module was i n  
a h igh ly  e c c e n t r i c  o r b i t  which, due t o  t h e  range l i m i t a t i o n s  of t h e  l a s e r  
a l t i m e t e r ,  caused t h e  l o s s  of approximately 50 percent  of t h e  a l t i t u d e  
da t a .  Since t h e  d a t a  l o s s  was not  due t o  a hardware malfunct ion,  t h e  
curve f o r  Apollo 15  i s  drawn a t  LOO percent  during t h i s  per iod .  
Contamination w i t h i n  t h e  l a s e r  module may have caused t h e  degrada t ion .  
Inves t iga t ions  a r e  i n  progress  t o  determine i f  t h e  mount  of l u b r i c a n t  i n  
t h e  Q-switch bear ings  can be reduced and t o  determine t h e  f e a s i b i l i t y  of 
confining t h e  Q-switch motor-rotor coupling a r e a  s o  t h a t  motor l u b r i c a n t  
would not be t r a n s f e r r e d  t o  t h e  o p t i c a l  s u r f a c e s .  The Q-switch c o n s i s t s  
of a prism r o t a t i n g  a t  approximately 22 000 r evo lu t ions  per  minute s o  t h a t  
t h e  o p t i c a l  alignment r equ i r ed  f o r  l a s i n g  i s  maintained f o r  an extremely 
s h o r t  pe r iod ,  thereby  r e s u l t i n g  i n  compression of t h e  l a s e r  energy i n t o  a 
high-amplitude pu l se  about 13 microseconds i n  du ra t ion .  Inves t iga t ions  
w i l l  a l s o  be  conducted t o  determine i f  flashlamp degradat ion and s u r f a c e  
f i n i s h  of t h e  ruby rod a r e  poss ib l e  f a i l u r e  causes.  Add i t i ona l ly ,  an in-  
v e s t i g a t i o n  i s  i n  progress  t o  determine means f o r  improving t h e  ope ra t ion  
of t h e  l a s e r  power s t a t u s  sensor ,  
This anomaly i s  open. 
6.4 PANORAMIC CAMERA AUTOMATIC EXPOSURE CONTROL 
INDICATED LOW LIGHT LEVELS 
The panoramic camera conta ins  a l i g h t  sensor  and a s soc i a t ed  c i r c u i t r y  
t h a t  determines t h e  f i l m  exposure. As t h e  scene luminance decreases ,  t h e  
output from t h e  sensor  decreases ;  t h e  r e s u l t i n g  s i g n a l  de l ive red  t o  t h e  
s l i t  width servo  causes t h e  exposure s l i t  t o  widen, thereby au tomat ica l ly  
i nc reas ing  t h e  f i l m  exposure. The s l i t  width and t h e  l i g h t  sensor  output  
a r e  both te lemetered  ( f i g .  6-4) .  
Throughout t h e  mission,  te lemet ry  i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  t h e  sensor  output  was 
t o o  low, r e s u l t i n g  i n  a s l i t  width t h a t  was t o o  wide. Consequently, an 
overexposure of t h e  f i l m  occurred. Based upon p r e f l i g h t  br ightness  celcu-  
i a t i o n s  and real- t ime mapping camera exposure d a t a ,  t h e  degree of overex- 
posure was es t imated  t o  be approximately 1 1 / 2  f - s tops .  A s  a consequence, 
t h e  f i l m  processing was iiiodified t o  compensate f o r  t h i s  degree of overex- 
posure.  k preliminary review of -the processed f i l m  ind ica t e s  t h a t  t h e  
photography was not  conlpromised, 
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Prel iminary a n a l y s i s  i nd ica t e s  t h a t  t h e  problem was, most l i k e l y ,  t h e  
r e s u l t  of a f a i l u r e  w i th in  t h e  l i g h t  sensor  o r  i t s  c i r c u i t r y  ( f i g .  6-5). 
Breadboard t e s t s  a r e  be ing  conducted i n  an e f f o r t  t o  i s o l a t e  t h e  f a i l u r e  
and prelaunch d a t a  a r e  be ing  reviewed t o  determine i f  t h e  problem could 
have occurred p r i o r  t o  f l i g h t .  
This anomaly i s  open. 
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Figure 6-5 .- Panoramic camera l ight sensor assembly. 
